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UNREGULATED INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATIONS: ACHIEVING FAIRNESS 
FOR CORPORATE CONSTITUENTS 
Bruce A. Green* 
Ellen S. Podgor** 
Abstract: This Article focuses on the relationship between corporations 
and their employee constituents in the context of corporate internal in-
vestigations, an unregulated multimillion-dollar business. The classic ap-
proach provided in the 1981 Supreme Court opinion, Upjohn v. United 
States, is contrasted with the reality of modern-day internal investigations 
that may exploit individuals to achieve a corporate benefit with the gov-
ernment. Attorney-client privilege becomes an issue as corporate con-
stituents perceive that corporate counsel is representing their interests, 
when in fact these internal investigators are obtaining information for the 
corporation to barter with the government. Legal precedent and ethics 
rules provide little relief to these corporate employees. This Article sug-
gests that courts need to move beyond the Upjohn decision and recognize 
this new landscape. It advocates for corporate fair dealing and provides a 
multifaceted approach to achieve this aim. Ultimately this Article consid-
ers how best to level the playing field between corporations and their em-
ployees in matters related to the corporate internal investigation. 
Introduction 
 Corporate internal investigations serve important societal func-
tions. They allow the entity to discover misbehavior within the corpora-
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tion, make corrections, and model conduct to assure future compli-
ance with the law and the regulatory structure.1 Internal investigations 
offer a cooperative resolution for corporate improprieties, while incen-
tivizing corporations to unmask misconduct.2 Internal investigations 
also allow corporations to quietly investigate allegations that may later 
prove to be bogus, without fear that disclosure will hurt the company’s 
reputation. 
 At the same time, corporate internal investigations can lead to 
abuses. They are privately structured, lacking regulatory oversight, and 
for the most part unmonitored in law.3 They are a multimillion-dollar 
business with most of the control resting within the hands of the entity.4 
It has been argued that, at times, corporations’ lawyers conducting in-
ternal investigations are deceptive (for example, by exploiting individu-
als’ beliefs that the lawyers or the corporation are looking out for their 
constituents’ interests) or coercive (for example, by employing actual or 
perceived threats against individuals who fail to cooperate).5 Corporate 
officers and employees who later face criminal prosecution have chal-
lenged the admissibility of their statements to corporate counsel on a 
number of grounds, drawing on the law relating to attorney-client privi-
lege, criminal procedure, and lawyers’ professional conduct, among 
other areas.6 But the law places only marginal limits on the conduct of 
corporate internal investigations and affords protection to corporate 
constituents only in extreme cases.7 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See Mark P. Goodman & Daniel J. Fetterman, Conducting Internal Investigations, in De-
fending Corporations and Individuals in Government Investigations 87, 91 (Daniel 
J. Fetterman & Mark P. Goodman eds., 2011) (discussing management’s obligation to in-
vestigate alleged wrongdoing to minimize the company’s risk). 
2 See infra notes 83–101 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
4 See Mei Lin Kwan-Gett, Recommended Practices for Companies and Their Counsel in Con-
ducting Internal Investigations, PLI Ethics Programs, Summer 2011, at 418 n.28. The terms 
“entity” and “corporation” are used largely interchangeably throughout this Article. 
5 R. William Ide, III, Am. Bar Ass’n, Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, Re-
port 16 (2006), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/ 
hod/emprights_report_adopted.pdf (describing coercive tactics); Lawton P. Cummings, The 
Ethical Mine Field: Corporate Internal Investigations and Individual Assertions of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 109 W. Va. L. Rev. 669, 670 (2007) (describing the pressure on corporate counsel 
not to be fully forthright). 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (criminal procedure); 
United States v. Norris, 722 F. Supp. 2d 632, 634 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (attorney-client privilege); 
Plaintiff’s Original Petition at 2–3, Pendergest-Holt v. Stanford Grp. Co., No. 2009-22392 
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2009) (attorney ethics rules and malpractice law). 
7 See, e.g., infra notes 155–186 and accompanying text (describing the unfairness of 
one specific case). The law also places corporate counsel in what one court termed “a po-
tential legal and ethical mine field.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 
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 To a small degree, ethics rules and corporate practice call upon 
lawyers to take steps to prevent or correct individuals’ erroneous beliefs 
that the corporation’s lawyers represent them, but the traditionally 
used warnings, to the effect that the lawyers represent only the corpora-
tion, do not overcome all expectations developed by employees who 
have grown accustomed to turning to corporate counsel when an issue 
with legal implications arises. Once the lawyers have clarified their role, 
the ethics rules do not forbid them from developing and taking advan-
tage of individuals’ expectation that the corporation’s interests are 
aligned with their own and that the corporation, including its lawyers, 
will protect them.8 
 Consequently, individuals with little or no legal training, and un-
aware of the ramifications and personal consequences, readily cooper-
ate in providing information to corporate lawyers conducting internal 
investigations, even when the corporation is already assisting govern-
ment prosecutors or regulators in their investigation of corporate em-
ployees or anticipates doing so in exchange for leniency. The more 
problematic scenarios occur in situations that are never scrutinized by 
the judiciary, as they emanate from corporate internal investigations 
that remain essentially unregulated and private. 
 The ambiguous nature of the corporate constituent’s identity as 
either aligned with or antithetical to the entity during a corporate inter-
nal investigation becomes a more pronounced issue as the number of 
corporate internal investigations continues to increase each year.9 These 
investigations can commence for a host of different reasons,10 and law-
yers are often an integral part of the internal investigation because their 
                                                                                                                      
340 (4th Cir. 2005); see Katrice Bridges Copeland, In-House Counsel Beware!, 39 Fordham 
Urb. L.J. 391, 432–33 (2011). 
8 See infra notes 199–204 and accompanying text. 
9 See Benton J. Campbell & Katelyn Beaudette, The Way Forward: A Primer on Conducting an 
Independent Investigation, Director Notes, 1, 1 (Feb. 2012), http://www.conference-board. 
org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-DN-V4N3-12.pdf&type=subsite (“Since 2001, public 
companies have retained outside counsel to conduct more than 3,000 internal investigations 
encompassing a staggering range of subject matters.”). Some of these investigations may be 
limited to determining if one or a few employees have adhered to corporate compliance 
measures. The increased growth of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases and the fact 
that 2011 marked the “largest number of enforcement actions brought in a single year by the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the agency’s history” has likely increased 
the need for corporate investigations. Campbell & Beaudette, supra, at 1. 
10 See infra notes 83–101 and accompanying text. 
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participation enables the corporation to claim attorney-client and work-
product protections for the results of the investigation.11 
 In this investigative stage, the corporation may be undecided 
whether to come forward with evidence of wrongdoing that its lawyers 
discover or whether to assist the government should it proceed with an 
investigation or file charges against the company. Notwithstanding the 
frequent practice of bartering information obtained from an internal 
investigation in exchange for a non-prosecution, deferred prosecution, 
or other favorable treatment,12 it may be uncertain at the very outset, 
or before the investigation concludes, whether the corporation is an 
ally or adversary of the government and likewise whether its interests 
are aligned with or adverse to its employee constituents. Even if the 
corporation anticipates turning over its investigative conclusions or 
other work product to the government, disclosing this intention to its 
constituents may undermine the investigation.13 Thus, while the corpo-
rate internal investigation takes place, the constituent employees may 
be uncertain whether the company is their friend, or may believe in-
correctly that they are being protected by the corporation. 
                                                                                                                     
 Corporations’ internal investigations contrast with government 
and regulatory investigations, which are subject to rules of criminal 
procedure and federal statutes to protect individuals from overreach-
ing by investigators.14 Because corporations’ internal investigations 
 
 
11 See Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of Internal 
Investigations, 39 Fordham Urb. L.J. 361, 363, 367–68 (2011) (describing the use of attor-
neys to “shield” the conclusions of internal investigations). 
12 See Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in Business 
Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 23, 46 (2010). 
13 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 516–17 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that warnings will decrease the incidence of confessions). If the company decides 
to enter into a plea or a deferred or non-prosecution agreement, a key component of that 
agreement may be to provide information about wrongdoing by individual employees 
within the company. The company can secure an advantage by trading this information so 
that the government can prosecute individual wrongdoers. See infra notes 143–186 and 
accompanying text. 
14 Internal investigations do not provide rights such as the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate 
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 311, 353, 365–71 (2007) (describing the requirement 
for state action for Fifth Amendment protection to arise). An individual being questioned 
also does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Stein, 541 F.3d at 152 (noting 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when adversarial judicial criminal 
proceedings have begun). Should an individual assert these rights, there is no judicial 
oversight for enforcement as these investigations are not part of a court proceeding. See 
Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 Ind. L.J. 
411, 425 n.45 (2007) (noting that even when prosecutors are involved after internal inves-
tigations, agreements are not overseen by the court). 
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are regarded by the law as private employment matters in which the 
government has no part, they are essentially unregulated by legal pro-
tections and unmonitored by courts as they occur.15 Decisions of 
whether to conduct an investigation,16 who will conduct one,17 and its 
scope are for the entity to decide.18 Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP)19 and professional ethics rules of attorneys20 pro-
vide only modest restraints on accountants and attorneys who conduct 
these investigations. The Department of Justice (DOJ), other federal 
agencies,21 or a state government that may concurrently or subse-
quently investigate the corporate conduct in question is not a direct 
                                                                                                                      
In contrast to the employees’ lack of rights when investigated by the corporation, the 
corporation has rights when investigated by the government. Corporations are treated as 
persons for purposes of prosecution, so they are afforded some of the same rights pro-
vided to individuals. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010). In a few 
areas differences can be seen. For example, a corporation’s documents may not have Fifth 
Amendment protection, although the act of producing those documents may be provided 
protection from self-incrimination. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402, 404–
05 (1976). 
15 See Weissmann & Newman, supra note 14, at 425 n.45. Obstruction of justice statutes, 
however, which prohibit conduct such as destruction of documents that impedes the “due 
administration of justice,” may be an overarching concern during an internal corporate 
investigation. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503–1518 (2006). 
16 The corporate board has fiduciary duties to shareholders and the company that may 
influence this decision. See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight 
Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 7–16 (2001) (describing direc-
tors’ duties of care and loyalty). 
17 Routine internal investigations may be conducted by internal corporate counsel. 
Larger investigations are typically handled by outside independent counsel. See Kwan-Gett, 
supra note 4, at 417–19. It is often difficult to ascertain the complexity of the inquiry and 
the problems that may be forthcoming prior to actually conducting an internal investiga-
tion. 
18 Corporations typically have an independent committee from the board of directors 
that will provide oversight of the internal investigation, including setting its scope. Id. at 
419–21. 
19 See generally Dan L. Goldwasser & M. Thomas Arnold, Accountants’ Liability 
§ 2.3 (1996) (discussing accounting standards). 
20 States pass rules of professional conduct for attorneys. See generally ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct: About the Model Rules, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/pro- 
fessional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited 
Dec. 12, 2012). For a discussion of applicable ethics rules, see infra notes 199–204 and ac-
companying text. 
21 The DOJ may not be the exclusive investigator of potential criminal conduct. For 
example, the SEC may investigate securities fraud or insider trading, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) may be at the forefront in tax investigations, the Environment Protection 
Agency (EPA) will likely conduct joint environmental criminal investigations with the DOJ, 
and the U.S. Postal Service may be a participant with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and DOJ in mail fraud prosecutions. 
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participant in the corporate internal investigation.22 Although the 
DOJ may become an indirect participant in a corporate internal inves-
tigation, the procedural protection ordinarily applicable to govern-
ment investigations does not apply as a result.23 
 Part I of this Article provides background material on the devel-
opment of corporate criminality, government investigations, and the 
motivations and considerations of companies that are conducting in-
ternal investigations.24 It highlights some of the problems that arise as a 
result of these internal investigations, but also notes the important 
purposes these investigations serve for the company and society. 
 Part II discusses the varying approaches that may be taken by the 
entity conducting an investigation.25 As Part III notes, in some instances 
investigations are conducted with a long-term expectation of confiden-
tiality.26 Although counsel does not formally represent the individuals, 
the individuals expect the company to look out for its employees’ inter-
ests and, therefore, to preserve the confidentiality of their statements 
unless it is in the shared interest of the company and its employees to 
disclose them.27 This paradigm is illustrated by Upjohn v. United States,28 
and influenced by the Supreme Court’s opinion in that case. 
 This contrasts with a growing number of instances in which the 
interests of the corporation and its individual employees are adverse 
because the corporation is, or expects soon to be, currying favor with 
public prosecutors or regulators.29 Corporations effectively serve as 
                                                                                                                      
 
22 A state or federal government agency may be a direct participant if there had been a 
prior act of misconduct and the corporate entity was subject to a deferred prosecution 
agreement or non-prosecution agreement that included a government-appointed internal 
monitor who issued reports directly to the government. 
23 But see Stein, 541 F.3d at 136, 147 (extending procedural rights to employees after 
the fact due to “the government’s overwhelming influence” in the corporation’s decision 
to withhold funds for employees’ counsel, and noting that the state action doctrine re-
quires the government to exert “significant encouragement” on a private party before 
rights will be extended). 
24 See infra notes 35–113 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 114–204 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 205–243 and accompanying text. 
27 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981). 
28 See id. 
29 Professor Susan B. Heyman has noted that current DOJ memoranda guide corpora-
tions in currying favor with the government and has suggested using a “bottoms-up” ap-
proach to “maintain[ ] employees’ legal rights” and to “better serve the interests of the 
government, the corporations, the employees, the shareholders, and the general public.” 
Susan B. Heyman, Bottoms-Up: An Alternative Approach for Investigating Corporate Malfeasance, 
37 Am J. Crim. L. 163, 167–69, 179 (2010) (discussing how providing individuals with in-
centives to cooperate could achieve deterrence). Professor Harry First has noted the 
“branch office” influence of the government in federal corporate prosecutions. See First, 
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agents of the government, providing federal prosecutors with proof of 
employee criminality.30 When corporate criminal conduct exists, cor-
porate counsel’s allegiance to the entity translates into an investigation 
that is minimally independent and more practically an investigation to 
accumulate evidence that the government cannot obtain from the cor-
poration without trading leniency for the corporation’s waiver of privi-
lege.31 But the corporation’s adversity to its constituents may not be 
evident to the individuals from whom the corporation’s lawyers seek 
information. 
 Part II of the Article also looks at the classic context in which this 
issue can reach the courts—litigation over the attorney-client privilege. 
Case law, such as Upjohn, presumes that corporate counsel represents 
the entity exclusively and therefore employees cannot claim the protec-
tion of the privilege. This Article critiques both judicial doctrine that 
favors corporations and the government at individuals’ expense32 and 
                                                                                                                      
 
supra note 12, at 28 (discussing how the government enlists corporations against employ-
ees to expose criminal liability within the corporation). See generally Prosecutors in the 
Boardroom: Using Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct (Anthony S. 
Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (discussing corporate monitors, deferred prosecu-
tion agreements, civil liability from corporate criminal misconduct, and other subjects 
related to the role of prosecutors in corporate issues emanating from corporate criminal 
conduct). Additionally, Professor Lisa Kern Griffin has discussed how corporate “partner-
ing” with the federal government shifts to “individual culpability.” See Griffin, supra note 
14, at 329–40. Thus, in this paradigm, the emphasis in an internal investigation is on the 
“investigation” —the discovery of evidence for use in a future government proceeding. 
30 See First, supra note 12, at 62 (calling corporations “agents” of the prosecutor). 
There are enormous incentives for a company to serve a cooperating role. In the criminal 
arena, cooperation provides increased ability to secure a deferred or non-prosecution 
agreement. The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, the DOJ’s guide for 
federal prosecutors considering whether to prosecute business organizations, states that 
prosecutors should weigh factors such as “the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclo-
sure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents.” Prin-
ciples of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, in Office of the U.S. Attorneys, U.S. 
Attorneys’ Manual § 9–28.300(A)(4) (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ 
eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/index.html. Government agencies also provide policies 
related to bringing actions against a corporation. See, e.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, En-
forcement Manual § 4.3 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/en- 
forcementmanual.pdf. 
31 See Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 77, 78–81 (2010) (comparing Arthur Andersen LLP’s prosecution, 
which eventually resulted in the company’s bankruptcy, to accounting firm KPMG’s de-
ferred prosecution agreement). 
32 See infra notes 187–204 and accompanying text. A growing number of judicial deci-
sions give deference to the corporation when a corporate executive claims that his or her 
attorney-client relationship precludes disclosure of information given as part of an inter-
nal corporate investigation. See Grace M. Giesel, Upjohn Warnings, the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, and Principles of Lawyer Ethics: Achieving Harmony, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 109, 151–58 
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ethics rules that fail to protect individuals, with the result that individu-
als are too susceptible to exploitation.33 
 Part III notes that although corporations may elect at times to pro-
tect their constituents and at other times to use the employees as chips 
with the government, there is no general duty of fair dealing required 
of the corporation to its constituents.34 Presented here is an approach 
that expands upon the analysis used in Upjohn to address the applicabil-
ity of the attorney-client privilege to individual employees in a manner 
that takes account of the importance of corporate fair dealing. The 
proposed multifaceted approach would help level the playing field be-
tween the individual constituent and the entity. 
 This Article also recommends that courts eliminate the presump-
tion that corporate counsel exclusively represents the corporation dur-
ing a corporate internal investigation. Ultimately, this Article stresses 
the need for corporate fair dealing during such investigations. 
I. Corporate Criminality and the Growth of  
Internal Investigations 
 Corporations have not always been subject to criminal charges. 
Section A of this Part looks at the development of corporate criminality, 
which explains the motivation for corporations to expend millions of 
dollars on internal investigations.35 Section B focuses on the increased 
number of government investigations and threats of prosecution.36 
Corporations obviously seek to avoid criminal liability and the enor-
mous collateral consequences that accompany a criminal charge, which 
can include possible shareholder civil actions. Section C discusses the 
attributes of corporate internal investigations—what they are, who 
conducts them, and the dynamic between individual employees and 
the corporation during these investigations.37 Section D looks at the 
incentives for a company to conduct such an investigation, including 
                                                                                                                      
(2010). Equally problematic is government interference with executive representation 
during the corporate or government investigation. See, e.g., Stein, 541 F.3d at 135–36 (dis-
cussing government interference with the payment of attorney’s fees following the indict-
ment of partners and employees of KPMG). 
33 See infra notes 199–204 and accompanying text. See generally Sarah Ribstein, Note, A 
Question of Costs: Considering Pressure on White-Collar Criminal Defendants, 58 Duke L.J. 857 
(2009) (discussing the consequences and magnitude of defense expenses in white collar 
cases). 
34 See infra notes 205–243 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 40–54 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 55–66 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 67–82 and accompanying text. 
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the opportunity to discern problems and prevent corporate exposure 
to criminal or regulatory proceedings.38 Finally, Section E examines key 
aspects of an internal investigation, noting how lawyers are integral 
players in the process.39 
A. Corporate Criminality 
 Corporations are characterized as “persons” for purposes of crimi-
nal liability.40 Initially, corporations were precluded from being crimi-
nally liable because as a “fiction,” a corporation could not be impris-
oned and could not have intent to commit a criminal act.41 Over time, 
however, courts allowed corporate criminality when criminal culpability 
was predicated on an omission, as opposed to an affirmative act.42 These 
strict liability crimes did not require a mens rea, so allowing criminal 
liability was consistent with the initial corporate criminal construct.43 
Eventually, courts moved to allowing corporate criminal liability beyond 
omission offenses, seeing no logical distinction between omissions and 
affirmative acts in the case of strict liability offenses.44 The turning point 
was when corporate criminality was allowed with mens rea offenses.45 In 
1909, in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States, the U.S. 
Supreme Court authorized criminal prosecution of a corporation for 
violations of the Elkins Act, a federal law, when the violations involved 
affirmative acts by agents of the corporation.46 
                                                                                                                      
38 See infra notes 83–101 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 102–113 and accompanying text. 
40 See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless 
the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals.”). 
41 See Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 741 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing the history of 
corporate criminal liability); John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Criminal Responsibility, in 1 Ency-
clopedia of Crime and Justice 253, 257 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). 
42 See Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate and White Collar Crime: Simplifying the Ambiguous, 31 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 391, 394 (1994) (noting the different stages of corporate criminal liability’s 
evolution). 
43 Id. 
44 LaFave, supra note 41, at 741. 
45 See Podgor, supra note 42, at 394. 
46 212 U.S. 481, 491, 494–96 (1909) (imputing to a corporation the knowledge and 
purpose of “any director or officer thereof, or any receiver, trustee, lessee, agent or person 
acting for or employed by such corporation”). New York Central marked a radical departure 
from historical approaches. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the 
Punishment of Corporations, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1359 (2009) (contrasting the criminal 
punishment of corporations today with historical approaches). 
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 Today, corporate criminality is premised upon either of two meth-
odologies: respondeat superior, which is the majority position,47 or the 
Model Penal Code approach, which asks whether a “high managerial 
agent” acted criminally for the benefit of the corporate entity.48 Estab-
lishing a sufficient mens rea is facilitated by decisions finding that “col-
lective knowledge” can be used to achieve the requisite mens rea.49 Al-
though many argue that the acts of a rogue employee should not 
subject a corporation to criminal liability,50 courts have not endorsed a 
                                                                                                                      
 
47 Ellen S. Podgor, Introduction, Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 Stetson L. Rev. 1, 2–3 
(2011) (introducing a symposium on corporate criminal liability). Liability is found if the 
act is within the scope of the employee’s employment and is for the benefit of the entity. 
Id. at 2. 
48 Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c), (4)(cx) (1985). To incur corporate criminal liabil-
ity, the individual must commit the act for the benefit of the corporation, as opposed to 
the individual. See Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128–29, 131 (5th 
Cir. 1962) (reversing convictions that were premised on acts that did not directly benefit 
the corporation). 
Scholars have suggested other approaches to ascertaining corporate criminality. See 
Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1095, 1098–1101, 1158–64 (1991) (proposing a corporate ethos standard and eval-
uating discussions of Gerhard O.W. Mueller, John Braithwaite, and Brent Fisse on corpo-
rate criminal liability); see also V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It 
Serve?, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1532–34 (1996) (advocating for an adaptation of corporate 
civil liability strategies to avoid the costs of corporate criminal liability). 
49 See Alschuler, supra note 46, at 1365 & n.41 (citing cases finding collective knowl-
edge sufficient for mens rea); Martin J. Weinstein & Patricia Bennett Ball, Criminal Law’s 
Greatest Mystery Thriller: Corporate Guilt Through Collective Knowledge, 29 New. Eng. L. Rev. 65, 
70–79 (1994) (discussing early collective knowledge cases and expressing the importance 
of the collective knowledge doctrine in corporate criminal law). “[C]ollective knowledge 
holds a corporation criminally liable where one employee intends an action and another, 
albeit innocent, employee carries it out.” Weinstein & Ball, supra, at 67. Courts will some-
times give a collective knowledge instruction that allows the jury to aggregate knowledge 
from different parts of the corporate organization to determine whether the corporation 
has the mens rea for the crime. See United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 856 
(1st Cir. 1987) (holding that “[s]ince the Bank had the compartmentalized structure 
common to all large corporations,” a collective knowledge instruction was proper). 
50 A “good faith” defense would shelter “law-abiding corporations” from rogue em-
ployees by protecting “those who present ‘good faith’ efforts to achieve compliance with 
the law as demonstrated in their corporate compliance program.” See Ellen S. Podgor, A 
New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative Defense, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1537, 
1538 (2007) [hereinafter Podgor, A New Corporate World]. Many scholars have argued for a 
corporate “good faith” defense. See H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corpora-
tions for the Acts of Their Employees and Agents, 41 Loy. L. Rev. 279, 326–28 (1995) (advocat-
ing for a good faith affirmative defense); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, 
and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1341, 1420 (1999) (discussing alternative 
corporate criminal culpability models); Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping 
Strict Liability Crimes, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 401, 468–69 (1993) (discussing a good faith de-
fense to corporate criminality); Podgor, A New Corporate World, supra, at 1543 (advocating 
for a good faith defense); Ellen S. Podgor, Educating Compliance, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
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“good faith” exception to corporate liability.51 The Supreme Court’s 
2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission regarding 
corporate campaign contributions emphasized the value of corporate 
personhood,52 thereby offering a schematic for expanding prosecu-
tions53 of corporations.54 
B. Government Investigations 
 Government investigations of corporate misconduct have in-
creased in recent years. In the wake of the Enron scandal,55 President 
George W. Bush issued an executive order in 2002 that created the 
                                                                                                                      
1523, 1529 n.39 (2009) [hereinafter Podgor, Educating Compliance] (citing to authors advo-
cating for a “good faith” defense); Weissmann & Newman, supra note 14, at 451 (arguing 
that corporate criminal liability should be tied to corporations’ implementation of effec-
tive compliance systems). 
51 See Podgor, A New Corporate World, supra note 50, at 1538 (noting that the legal sys-
tem has not yet adopted a “‘good faith’ affirmative defense”). 
52 130 S. Ct. at 886. 
53 See id. at 900 (“The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of 
corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amend-
ment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’”). Citing a long list of 
cases, the Supreme Court in Citizens United stated that “[t]he Court has recognized that 
First Amendment protection extends to corporations.” Id. at 899. This can be contrasted 
with Justice John Paul Stevens’s concurrence and dissent in part, which states that “[t]he 
fact that corporations are different from human beings might seem to need no elabora-
tion, except that the majority opinion almost completely elides it.” Id. at 971. He also stat-
ed: 
It might also be added that corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no 
feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help structure and facilitate 
the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their “personhood” often 
serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of “We 
the People” by whom and for whom our Constitution was established. 
Id. at 972. 
54 See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Thoughts on the Corporation as a Person for Pur-
poses of Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 Stetson L. Rev. 137 (2011) (discussing the effect of 
Citizens United on corporate criminal liability); Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the 
Corporate Entity: Changing Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United, 
65 U. Miami L. Rev. 1 (2010) (examining the impact of the Citizens United decision on 
deferred- and non-prosecution agreements); Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United and 
Corporate and Human Crime, 41 Stetson L. Rev. 127 (2011) (discussing four potential out-
growths of the Citizens United Court’s position on corporate personhood). 
55 The Enron debacle serves as a strong force in bringing to the forefront corporate 
misconduct. It has been compared with national scandals such as “Teapot Dome; Water-
gate; [and] the ‘Keating Five.’” Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan, Introduction to 
Enron: Corporate Fiascos and Their Implications, at ix, ix (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala 
G. Dharan eds., 2004). 
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Corporate Fraud Task Force.56 Although this Task Force was later re-
named the Financial Fraud Task Force by President Barack Obama in 
2009,57 a focus on investigating and prosecuting corporate fraud re-
mains.58 
 Government investigations are not limited to the DOJ, as regula-
tory agencies, state and local entities, and other administrative bodies 
may also investigate possible misconduct. It is also common to see par-
allel proceedings with both the DOJ and an agency like the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) or the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
simultaneously investigating the same conduct. The SEC’s increasing 
number of enforcement actions demonstrates its growing concern with 
fraudulent activities within the market.59 Significantly, many of these 
investigations involve conduct extraterritorial to the United States.60 
 The increased number of deferred and non-prosecution agree-
ments61 entered into between the DOJ and a host of different corpora-
                                                                                                                      
 
56 See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091–92 ( July 11, 2002). President Bush 
created the Corporate Fraud Task Force “to hold wrongdoers responsible and to restore an 
atmosphere of accountability and integrity within corporations across the country.” See The 
President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, U.S. Dep’t of Just., http://www.justice.gov/archive/ 
dag/cftf/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2012). 
57 Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. 60,123, 60,125 (Nov. 19, 2009); see also Press 
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, President Obama Establishes Interagency Financial 
Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/ 
2009-249.htm. President Obama’s executive order stated that “[t]his Task Force shall re-
place, and continue the work of, the Corporate Fraud Task Force created by Executive 
Order 13271 of July 9, 2002.” 74 Fed. Reg. at 60,125 § 7(b). 
58 See About the Task Force, Fin. Fraud Enforcement Task Force, http://www.stop 
fraud.gov/about.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2012) (highlighting securities fraud, mortgage 
scams, procurement fraud, and other frauds); The President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, 
supra note 56 (highlighting securities and commodities fraud, bank fraud, and other 
frauds). Some scholars think there should be more emphasis on actual corporate prosecu-
tions. See, e.g., Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime from Task 
Force to Top Priority, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 971, 973 (2010) (calling for the establishment of a 
Corporate Crimes Division of the DOJ as opposed to ad hoc task forces). 
59 See Mary L. Schapiro, Message from the Chairman, in U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, FY 
2011 Performance and Accountability Report 2, 2 (2011), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2011.pdf#2011review. “[T]he SEC filed 735 enforcement 
actions, an 8.6 percent increase from 2010 and more cases than ever previously filed . . . .” 
Id. “Since 2008, the SEC has filed 36 actions against 81 individual and corporate defen-
dants alleging a wide range of misconduct arising from the financial crisis.” Id. at 13. See 
generally Robert Khuzami, Outline of Recent SEC Enforcement Actions, in The SEC Speaks in 
2011, at 171 (2011) (providing summaries of recent cases). 
60 See Dervan, supra note 11, at 363 & n.7, 366 (noting the globalization of internal 
corporate investigations, including cooperation among prosecutors in different countries, 
and discussing the challenges faced in conducting internal investigations abroad). 
61 See Sue Reisinger, DOJ and SEC Use of Deferred and Non-prosecution Agreements in 2011, 
Corp. Couns., Jan. 10, 2012; see also Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred 
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tions also provides ample evidence of government attention to corpo-
rate irregularities and fraud.62 Although few prosecutions and regula-
tory proceedings against corporations go to trial,63 settlement can be 
onerous. The fines levied against corporations for misconduct have 
reached new levels.64 Following the highly publicized criminal prosecu-
                                                                                                                      
 
Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 Ky. L.J. 1, 4–6 (2007) (examin-
ing the increase in deferred and non-prosecution agreements). Non-prosecution agree-
ments are merely letters between the government and the corporation; they provide no 
judicial oversight. See Zierdt & Podgor, supra, at 14–15 (contrasting judicial oversight and 
non-prosecution agreements). 
62 See Ryan D. McConnell et al., Plan Now or Pay Later: The Role of Compliance in Criminal 
Cases, 33 Hous. J. Int’l L. 509, 563 (2011) (noting the spike in non-prosecution and de-
ferred prosecution agreements after the famous bankruptcy of Arthur Andersen LLP fol-
lowing indictment); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current 
Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 159, 159–61 (2008) (discuss-
ing the proliferation of deferred and non-prosecution agreements as a result of the DOJ’s 
policy “to reform corrupt corporate cultures”); Zierdt & Podgor, supra note 61, at 4–6. See 
generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-110, DOJ Has Taken Steps to 
Better Track Its Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, but Should 
Evaluate Effectiveness (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10110.pdf 
(exploring the DOJ’s increased use of deferred and non-prosecution agreements, its track-
ing of such agreements, and discussing judicial involvement in the process). 
63 See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 62, at 2 (“From fiscal years 
2004 to 2009, for [U.S. Attorneys’ offices], the number of [deferred prosecution agree-
ments] and [non-prosecution agreements] was less than the number of corporate prosecu-
tions, whereas for the Criminal Division, the number of [deferred prosecution agree-
ments] and [non-prosecution agreements] was comparable to the number of corporate 
prosecutions.”). Although there are many corporate prosecutions, very few lead to trial. 
This is due in large part to companies entering into deferred prosecutions or settling via 
plea negotiations. See id. Three recent prominent trials include United States v. W.R. Grace, 
United States v. Aguilar (Lindsey Manufacturing Co.), and United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP. 
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005); United States v. Aguilar, 
831 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Verdict Form as to Defendant W.R. Grace at 
1, United States v. W.R. Grace, No. 05-07-M (D. Mont. May 8, 2009). W.R. Grace resulted in 
a verdict of not guilty. See David S. Hilzenrath & Carrie Johnson, W.R. Grace Acquitted in 
Montana Asbestos Case, 3 Former Officials Also Found Not Guilty, May 9, 2009, Wash. Post, at 
A14. In Lindsey Manufacturing, the court dismissed the case following a trial. See Aguilar, 
831 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. In Arthur Andersen, the accounting firm was convicted at trial, but 
the Supreme Court reversed its conviction. See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 698. 
64 See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, Pfizer to Pay Record $2.3 Billion Penalty for Illegal Drug Promo-
tions, Huffington Post (Sept. 2, 2009, 10:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2009/09/02/pfizer-to-pay-record-23b-_n_275012.html; Justice Department Hits ADM with 
$100 Million Criminal Fine. Shareholders, Victims Cry Foul, Corp. Crime Rep., Oct. 21, 1996, at 
1, 1; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Novo Nordisk Agrees to Pay $9 Million Fine in 
Connection with Payment of $1.4 Million in Kickbacks Through the United Nations Oil-
for-food Program (May 11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/May/09-crm-461. 
html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Saudi Arabia-Based Tamimi Global Company to 
Pay U.S. $13 Million to Resolve Criminal and Civil Allegations of Kickbacks and Illegal 
Gratuities (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/September/11-crm-1203. 
html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to 
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tion of accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP and the firm’s subse-
quent collapse, companies fold to government threats of indictment 
and do virtually anything required to avoid being prosecuted.65 This 
includes not only paying substantial fines and adopting enhanced cor-
porate compliance programs (including, often, appointing an inde-
pendent monitor), but also facilitating government investigations and 
prosecutions of individuals.66 
C. Corporate Internal Investigations 
 Although corporate internal investigations of misconduct are not 
new,67 the increased focus on corporate criminality has made these in-
vestigations a growth industry in the corporate culture.68 Upon notice of 
an internal problem, corporate boards can be quick to initiate an inves-
tigation to ascertain the corporation’s risk of a prosecution or regula-
tory proceeding, and, if such risk exists, how to respond.69 The possibil-
ity of shareholder derivative actions or other third-party civil claims 
                                                                                                                      
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Crimi-
nal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105. 
html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
(Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-tax-136.html. 
65 See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 698 (reversing Arthur Andersen LLP’s conviction); 
Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The Rise of Corporate White-Collar 
Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 1221, 1239–42 (2011). Although the ac-
counting firm was eventually successful on appeal at the U.S. Supreme Court, the collat-
eral consequences of the firm’s indictment had already destroyed the firm through bank-
ruptcy. See Weisselberg & Li, supra, at 1239. 
66 See Zierdt & Podgor, supra note 61, at 2; see also Weisselberg & Li, supra note 65, at 
1243–44 (discussing recent incentives for conducting an internal investigation). 
67 See, e.g., 15 Hutton Employees Are Cited, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1985, at D6 (discussing 
how former U.S. Attorney General Griffin B. Bell cited fifteen employees of E.F. Hutton as 
a result of evidence gathered in an internal investigation); see also Zierdt & Podgor, supra 
note 61, at 4, 39 (discussing how deferred prosecutions are not new, which require defen-
dants to comply with set conditions). 
68 “[W]e have reached a high water mark for government investigations in which the risk 
of becoming swept up in such an investigation is greater than ever before.” Daniel J. Fetter-
man & Mark P. Goodman, White Collar Landscape: Regulators, Targets and Priorities, in Defend-
ing Corporations and Individuals in Government Investigations, supra note 1, at 1, 
30; see Kwan-Gett, supra note 4, at 409 (“Since 2001, over 2,500 public companies have re-
tained outside counsel to conduct internal investigations into suspected wrong-doing by cor-
porate executives and employees.”) (citing Options Scorecard, Wall St. J. (Sept. 4, 2007), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html (provid-
ing examples of internal investigations related to stock-option grants and practices)). 
69 See Campbell & Beaudette, supra note 9, at 1–2. 
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looms in the background and complicates both the investigation and 
the corporation’s response.70 
 There is no fixed definition of a corporate internal investigation, 
and no specific attributes or set structure. An internal investigation is in 
essence an effort by a company to learn what has happened within the 
corporation or what was done by the corporation.71 In most instances 
the scope of this inquiry is decided by the corporation.72 
 Corporations give their lawyers access to corporate records, which 
become a principal source of information, but unlike government in-
vestigators, corporate counsel cannot employ grand juries, subpoenas, 
or court-authorized searches to gather information from third parties. 
Their investigation is private, not ancillary to any legal proceeding. 
Consequently, the other principal source of information is current offi-
cers and employees of the corporation, who may cooperate out of con-
sideration for the corporation or as a matter of employment obligation, 
or who may decline to do so, but at the risk of being fired.73 The indi-
vidual who is questioned has no Fifth Amendment right against in-
crimination or right to counsel: Miranda rights do not apply.74 The in-
dividual also has no due process right not to be coerced or tricked into 
cooperating.75 And, as noted by Professor Lisa Kern Griffin, private sec-
tor employees do not enjoy immunity during investigations, compara-
ble to what is offered to public employees pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s 1967 decision in Garrity v. New Jersey, holding that police offi-
                                                                                                                      
70 See Brown, supra note 16, at 18–29 (describing a seminal shareholder derivative suit 
in which a company’s directors failed to exercise good faith judgments about the com-
pany’s information and reporting system). Although there are some risks to a corporation 
in conducting an internal investigation, there are also huge incentives to move in this di-
rection. See id. at 25–26 (describing the criminal consequences of failing to assure legal 
compliance). 
71 See Kwan-Gett, supra note 4, at 410. 
72 Cf. id. at 419 (advising companies’ independent committees to set the scope of a 
special counsel’s investigation); Campbell & Beaudette, supra note 9, at 4 (advising inde-
pendent committees to set the scope of the investigation). One exception might be when 
the internal corporate investigation was an outgrowth of a deferred or non-prosecution 
agreement and is being conducted by an appointed monitor. See U.S. Gov’t Account-
ability Office, supra note 62, at 3–4 (describing corporate concerns with DOJ-selected 
monitors, including a lack of transparency in the scope of a monitor’s work). 
73 See Campbell & Beaudette, supra note 9, at 5 (“The committee should clearly com-
municate that employees who do not cooperate risk termination.”). 
74 See First, supra note 12, at 73. Miranda rights apply only during a custodial interroga-
tion. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (“By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initi-
ated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or other-
wise.”). 
75 See Griffin, supra note 14, at 366 n.288. 
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cers’ statements to the attorney general, elicited under threat of “re-
moval from office,” were coerced statements.76 
  Although the private process of a corporate internal investigation 
lacks government power, it is not always lacking coercion. Clearly a 
company may not commit a crime, such as assault, to secure informa-
tion from its employee. Putting a gun to the employee’s head would 
not be legally tolerated. But a company does have the ability to fire an 
individual who fails to comply or participate in the company’s investiga-
tion. The individual has no legal protection other than what may be 
stated in his or her employment agreement or implied in the contrac-
tual relationship.77 In employment-at-will states this may offer little re-
lief.78 Additionally, the individual constituent ordinarily owes loyalty to 
his or her employer and may therefore feel an obligation to participate 
in the entity’s internal investigation.79 Thus, although the corporate 
entity does not have subpoena or grand jury powers, the company’s 
constituents may nevertheless feel compelled to answer the questions of 
the attorney conducting the internal investigation.80 
 The corporation and its lawyer essentially have free rein. Any pos-
sible judicial scrutiny of this corporate conduct will occur only after the 
fact, if, for example, the individual is later indicted and challenges the 
admission of evidence that he or she provided during the internal in-
vestigation.81 The corporation owns the information obtained during 
the internal investigation and may exchange it for a favorable disposi-
tion from the government.82 The individual constituent has lost not 
only the confidentiality of the information but also the opportunity to 
barter this information with the government, leaving the employee ba-
sically powerless. 
                                                                                                                      
76 See 385 U.S. 493, 494, 500 (1967); Griffin, supra note 14, at 353–58. 
77 See Ribstein, supra note 33, at 874–75. 
78 Karen Patton Seymour & Allison Caffarone, Defending Individuals in Government In-
vestigations, in Defending Corporations and Individuals in Government Investiga-
tions, supra note 1, at 517, 519. 
79 See Griffin, supra note 14, at 337 (implying existing loyalty between the corporation 
and its employees); McConnell et al., supra note 62, at 556 (noting that employees have an 
obligation to participate in “internal controls and compliance”). 
80 See Griffin, supra note 14, at 355, 361 (arguing that because the threat of job loss ren-
ders one’s subsequent statements “coerced” in other contexts, the same standard should be 
applied to corporate internal investigations). 
81 See Katrice Bridges Copeland, Preserving the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 78 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 1199, 1218–20, 1228 (2010) (citing Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), 
aff’d, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a company’s preindictment conduct toward 
employees should receive judicial scrutiny only after indictment, and suggesting a similar 
outcome under current DOJ policy)). 
82 Cummings, supra note 5, at 681. 
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D. Incentives to Initiate a Corporate Internal Investigation 
 There are many incentives for corporations to conduct internal 
investigations. For example, corporations may now need to move more 
swiftly as new legislation—such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 201083 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
200284—places added requirements on corporations to timely report 
misconduct.85 Other recent statutes similarly require corporations to 
report misconduct, and an internal investigation may be necessary to 
assess whether the reporting is mandatory.86 Leniency programs also 
can incentivize a corporation to investigate misconduct and self-
report.87 Increased whistle blowing within entities and external qui tam 
matters can also serve as a prelude to internal investigations.88 Compa-
nies that enter into deferred and non-prosecution agreements may find 
themselves with an internal monitor and an obligation to review corpo-
rate conduct under the terms of the monitorship.89 The DOJ’s Principles 
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, which guides prosecutors’ 
discretion in determining whether a corporation will be indicted, takes 
into account “the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its 
                                                                                                                      
83 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
84 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
85 See John F. Savarese & Carol Miller, Internal Investigations 2011: Investigations in the Af-
termath of Dodd-Frank, in Internal Investigations 2011: Investigations in the After-
math of Dodd-Frank 357, 359 (1891 PLI/Corp. 2011). 
86 For example, many environmental statutes have reporting requirements. See, e.g., 
Oil and Hazardous Substance Liability, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(5) (2012) (“Any person in 
charge of a vessel or of an onshore facility or an offshore facility shall, as soon as he has 
knowledge of any discharge of oil or a hazardous substance from such vessel or facility in 
violation of paragraph (3) of this subsection, immediately notify the appropriate agency of 
the United States Government of such discharge.”); Notification Requirements Respecting 
Released Substances, 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (2006) (“Any person in charge of a vessel or an 
offshore or an onshore facility shall, as soon as he has knowledge of any release (other 
than a federally permitted release) of a hazardous substance from such vessel or facility . . . 
immediately notify the National Response Center . . . .”). 
87 See Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of 
Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 153, 172–83 (2010) 
(discussing the leniency programs available for antitrust violations). 
88 See Campbell & Beaudette, supra note 9, at 2. The whistleblower provisions of Dodd-
Frank likely will increase the need for corporate internal investigations. See Savarese & 
Miller, supra note 85, at 3. 
89 See generally Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The 
New Corporate Czar?, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1713 (2007) (discussing the powers and fiduciary 
duties of corporate monitors). 
90 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:73 
agents.”90 The federal sentencing guidelines also incentivize corpora-
tions to “exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal con-
duct,” which often necessitates an internal investigation.91 Finally, be-
cause of the threat of shareholder lawsuits, internal corporate 
investigations may be required by corporate boards as a component of 
combating this litigation.92 
 The risk of corporate criminal liability places huge pressures on 
corporations. For attorneys or certain auditors, a criminal charge could 
lead to the immediate loss of clientele or customers. Arthur Andersen 
LLP’s successful reversal of its criminal conviction at the Supreme 
Court proved irrelevant to the company as the collateral effect of the 
indictment and trial rendered it bankrupt.93 Likewise, findings of crim-
inality can result in program exclusion for those involved in the medi-
cal field, and defense procurement providers fear government debar-
ment following a criminal conviction.94 
 Corporate internal investigations are the prelude to forthcoming 
criminal prosecutions and negotiations with the government.95 When a 
corporation learns of possible wrongdoing, its reaction is typically to 
commence an internal investigation to ascertain the level and breadth 
of any misconduct.96 Corporations are notified of possible wrongdoing 
                                                                                                                      
90 Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 30, § 9–28.300(A)(4). 
91 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1(a)(1) (2011); see also Katherine 
M. Weiss, Upjohn Co. v. United States as Support for Selective Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 501, 522–25 (2007). The federal 
sentencing guidelines use a “carrot and stick” approach, offering incentives to corpora-
tions to advance corporate good citizenship. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, 
supra, § 8B2.1 Background. The guidelines and commentary offer guidance on what con-
stitutes an effective compliance program. See id. § 8B2.1(b) & cmt. nn.2–6 (including as-
signing responsibility for the program to high-level staff, training employees, and provid-
ing appropriate incentives to employees for compliance). 
92 See Campbell & Beaudette, supra note 9, at 3. Courts have noted the importance of hav-
ing an effective compliance program and have placed civil obligations on boards to maintain 
adequate compliance programs. See, e.g., McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 817 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing directors’ duty to monitor corporate compliance); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriva-
tive Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–70 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also Michael Volkov, Caremark, FCPA and 
Corporate Governance, White Collar Def. & Compliance ( July 11, 2011, 12:59 PM), http:// 
michaelvolkov.blogspot.com/2011/07/caremark-fcpa-and-corporate-governance. html. 
93 See Podgor, supra note 31, at 78–79. 
94 See Jerold H. Israel et al., White Collar Crime Law and Practice 676–80, 847 
(Thomson Reuters 3d ed., 2009) (discussing debarment, license revocation, and profes-
sional practice exclusion). 
95 See Kwan-Gett, supra note 4, at 411 (“There is a reasonable likelihood that any major 
internal investigation will be followed by, or conducted parallel to, an actual (or antici-
pated) external investigation . . . .”). 
96 See id. at 410. 
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through various sources, including internal whistleblowers, external qui 
tam actions, routine internal compliance measures implemented in re-
sponse to sentencing incentives,97 and judicial acknowledgments that 
corporate compliance is a necessary component of corporate govern-
ance.98 
 Internal corporate investigations can also accompany a criminal 
action. When a company is notified by the government of potential 
criminality, through receipt of either a search warrant or a subpoena 
duces tecum, the corporation must assess whether there is truth to the 
allegations and possibly accumulate the materials for submission to the 
grand jury.99 Corporate investigations may also be a function of a post-
indictment or deferred prosecution.100 Agreements with the govern-
ment often provide for monitors to be implanted within the entity to 
assure corporate compliance.101 Internal investigations may occur in 
this context to assure that the entity abides by the law. 
E. Conducting Corporate Internal Investigations 
 Corporate investigations follow no set path. The internal investiga-
tion industry basically operates with little oversight as the investigations 
are unmonitored and unregulated. The individuals conducting the in-
vestigation are often accountants or lawyers, or those working at their 
direction.102 Attorneys, and those contracted to work for the lawyers, 
can provide a better chance of maintaining an attorney-client privilege 
should the government seek to gather information acquired during the 
internal investigation.103 
 Practitioner’s literature provides significant advice to those con-
ducting internal investigations.104 This literature addresses who should 
                                                                                                                      
 
97 See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
98 See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–
70 (Del. 2006) (endorsing the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 1996 decision in In re Care-
mark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, and finding director oversight liability when 
directors fail to “implement any reporting or information system or controls” or when they 
implement a system but then fail “to monitor or oversee its operations”). 
99 See Kwan-Gett, supra note 4, at 410. 
100 See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 89, at 1724–26 (describing the scope of a moni-
tor’s work). 
101 See id. at 1721. 
102 Kwan-Gett, supra note 4, at 409 (“Since 2001, over 2,500 public companies have re-
tained outside counsel to conduct internal investigations into suspected wrong-doing by 
corporate executives and employees.”). 
103 See Dervan, supra note 11, at 367–68. 
104 See generally Gary R. Brown, Law School Didn’t Prepare You for This, Tips for the Internal In-
vestigation, ACC Docket (Assoc. of Corporate Counsel, Wash., D.C.), May 2010, at 58 (advis-
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conduct the internal investigation,105 what should be investigated, 
when the internal investigation should occur,106 where it should take 
place, how it should be conducted,107 and why this should occur. For 
example, some writings advise counsel to quickly determine whether 
his or her client is a target, subject, or witness of the investigation.108 
The literature discusses the process of determining who will conduct 
the investigation, recognizing that outside counsel provides greater ob-
jectivity but inside counsel will have greater familiarity with the internal 
workings of the company.109 Decisions are often made through the 
company’s independent audit committee.110 Practitioner literature of-
fers advice on how to conduct the investigation and how to collect 
documents for review.111 
                                                                                                                     
 Of particular significance is literature that recognizes the impor-
tance of interviews of employees, and the importance of preserving the 
attorney-client privilege while also advising interviewees that the attor-
ney represents the corporation.112 Much has been written about the 
warnings that should be given to employees of an entity when being 




ing in-house counsel on conducting internal investigations, including staffing, research, in-
terviews, and credibility assessments); Ernest E. Badway et al., A Primer on Government 
and Internal Investigations (2011), http://www.foxrothschild.com/newspubs/ 
newspubsArticle.aspx?id=4294970249 (giving an overview of white collar criminal investiga-
tions, the decisions businesses face when under investigation, and the factors businesses 
should consider in those decisions); Campbell & Beaudette, supra note 9 (describing when 
and how corporate management should conduct an investigation). 
105 See J. Justin Johnston, Corporate Investigations After the Mortgage Meltdown, J. Mo. B., 
Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 70, 73. 
106 See William M. Hannay, Designing an Effective FCPA and Anti-Bribery Com-
pliance Program §§ 4:2, 4:5 (2011). 
107 See David Z. Seide, An Outline on Internal Investigations, in Internal Investigations 
2010: How to Protect Your Clients or Company 214, 228–36 (1819 PLI/Corp. 2010). 
108 Badway et al., supra note 104, at 4. 
109 See, e.g., Campbell & Beaudette, supra note 9, at 4. 
110 See id. 
111 See Seide, supra note 107, at 229–36 (discussing how to establish an investigative 
plan). 
112 See Gregory A. Markel & Jason M. Halper, Internal Investigations, in 1 Business and 
Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts § 5:47 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2011) 
(discussing the giving of Upjohn warnings); see also infra notes 220–221 and accompanying 
text (discussing Upjohn warnings). 
113 See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 29, at 203–08 (describing the consequences of existing 
and proposed warnings). Some of the literature has even gone so far as to rename these 
warnings “Adnarim warnings” —Miranda spelled backward—to highlight the correlation, 
and lack thereof, to Miranda warnings. See id. at 204 & n.223 (quoting proposed, broader 
warnings); Robert G. Morillo & Robert J. Anello, Beyond ‘Upjohn’: Necessary Warnings in 
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II. Varying Approaches of Internal Investigations 
 The corporation’s posture during internal investigations is not 
fixed. The corporate-constituent role can be set when the investigation 
first commences, or the relationship may change over time. Clearly, a 
company that learns that its employee was embezzling will take a posi-
tion that is not aligned with the employee. Less certain is the corpora-
tion’s posture when an internal investigation is triggered by an anony-
mous message left on a hotline for reporting internal misconduct. 
 Two approaches are described here: one in which the company is 
aligned with the individual, and another in which the company decides 
not to protect the individual. Section A presents the first approach: the 
model used in considering the role of the attorney-client privilege in 
the 1981 U.S. Supreme Court case, Upjohn Co. v. United States, which 
extended attorney-client privilege to specific communications between 
corporate employees and corporate counsel.114 Section B describes the 
second approach: the reality of a modern-day internal investigation in 
which the government is an integral force in the entity’s decision mak-
ing.115 
 Irrespective of the approach taken, courts and ethics rules favor 
the entity over the individual when issues arise, as discussed in Section 
C.116 When an individual constituent seeks to protect him- or herself in 
a criminal proceeding and tries to preclude the government from using 
evidence he or she provided during a corporate internal investigation, 
courts have for the most part held that the attorney-client privilege is 
controlled by the corporation, which may waive the privilege and dis-
close the constituent’s statements to counsel, to the constituent’s det-
riment.117 
A. Corporate-Individual Alignment 
 One approach to corporate internal investigations assumes a sym-
biotic relationship between the corporation and its individual employ-
ees. In general, the company and its employees are on the same team; 
                                                                                                                      
Internal Investigations, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 4, 2005, at 3, 3 (discussing the problems inherent for 
lawyers in conducting internal investigations). 
114 449 U.S. 383, 394–95 (1981) (protecting, under attorney-client privilege, commu-
nications from employees to corporate counsel when the communications were made at 
the behest of the employees’ superiors and were concerning matters within the scope of 
their employment); see infra notes 118–142 and accompanying text. 
115 See infra notes 143–186 and accompanying text. 
116 See infra notes 187–204 and accompanying text. 
117 See infra notes 187–204 and accompanying text. 
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they are looking out for each other. Although indictment may follow 
for rogue employees and executives, the company’s internal investiga-
tion is designed strictly for its internal review. If the corporation later 
reports its findings to the government, it does so as a good corporate 
citizen when criminality is unexpectedly discovered through this inter-
nal review, and not because the corporation all along had an incentive 
to obtain evidence as a bargaining chip. 
 The corporate internal investigation in this model is strictly “inter-
nal.” It is intended to enable the company’s counsel to give informed 
advice or other legal assistance and is conducted in secret with an ex-
pectation that confidentiality will be maintained long term. Employees 
provide information to the company’s lawyers, not because they are 
coerced or tricked into doing so, but because they identify with the 
company’s interest in obtaining legal assistance and understand that 
this is consistent with their own interest as employees. Thus, the rela-
tionship is cooperative. Although the internal investigation may have 
been instigated by a government investigation, subpoena, or notice, the 
federal government is neither an intended beneficiary of the investiga-
tion nor a direct or indirect participant in it. 
 The investigation may be conducted by in-house counsel or out-
side counsel, and it may be initiated by corporate counsel, the board of 
directors, or an audit committee.118 Investigating counsel may go to 
enormous lengths to ensure that confidentially is maintained. This can 
include stamping all investigative materials “attorney-client privileged” 
and “work product,” maintaining a separate filing depository, making 
certain that recorded statements contain opinions, and being careful 
not to allow for any voluntary disclosure of materials outside of the in-
vestigating group.119 If the government decides to intercede to obtain 
                                                                                                                      
118 Brown, supra note 104, at 60; Badway et al., supra note 104, at 6. This acknowl-
edgment that inside counsel may at times conduct the investigation should in no way be 
interpreted as an acceptance of having this counsel as the primary party overseeing the 
investigation. The use of internal counsel can present unique problems if the investigation 
escalates to a level that includes government involvement. See Kwan-Gett, supra note 4, at 
417. That said, it is also important to recognize the realities of these investigations and the 
fact that when the initial determination is made to conduct an investigation, there may be 
little evidence of a significant problem that warrants the necessity to invest in the cost of 
outside attorneys. Cf. id. at 410 (“[I]nvestigations are thus meant to determine the validity 
and seriousness of the circumstances alleged or disclosed . . . .”). 
119 See Philip R. Sellinger, Preserving the Attorney-Client and Work-Product Privileges While 
Conducting Internal Corporate Investigations, ABA Seminar on White Collar Crime (1989), 
reprinted in Israel et al., supra note 94, at 606 (West Publ’g Co. 1996) (listing the different 
ways counsel can be used in a corporate investigation to ensure that privilege is main-
tained). 
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reports, documents, or statements from the corporate investigation, the 
corporation is quick to assert its privilege and to advocate that it should 
be allowed to maintain the confidentiality of this corporate internal 
investigation. 
 Because the company and individual employees are aligned, indi-
viduals can cooperate in this investigation and not fear that their state-
ments will be relayed to the federal government in order for the com-
pany to receive an advantage. Obviously, those with direct criminal 
exposure may be fearful to cooperate in the investigation, as the corpo-
ration remains free to relay criminal evidence to the government in 
order for the government to prosecute rogue employees. So too, the 
entity may pressure uncooperative individuals, invoking its power to fire 
an individual who fails to provide answers to its investigators. But the 
starting point for this investigation has the corporation and individual 
on the same page. If the company is in fact a “friend,” proceeding in 
this manner does not place the individual at unfair risk. 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Upjohn is the classic illustration 
of this paradigm.120 Upjohn involved an internal investigation by a 
pharmaceutical company that had received word from independent 
accountants of possible improper payments to “foreign government 
officials in order to secure government business.”121 The company took 
the initiative to investigate this alleged wrongdoing by sending a ques-
tionnaire to key employees “for the purpose of determining the nature 
and magnitude of any payments made by the Upjohn Company or any 
of its subsidiaries to any employee or official of a foreign govern-
ment.”122 Managers were instructed of the “highly confidential” nature 
of this investigation.123 Counsel also conducted interviews.124 
 Upjohn thereafter submitted disclosures of the questionable pay-
ments in reports to the SEC and the IRS, which provoked a govern-
ment investigation to determine tax consequences owing from the 
company.125 The IRS issued a summons seeking the files of Upjohn 
                                                                                                                      
120 See 449 U.S. at 387–88 (describing how the Upjohn Company refused to produce 
notes of interviews with employees or questionnaires despite an IRS subpoena). 
121 Id. at 386–87. 
122 Id. The investigation was conducted by Upjohn’s general counsel, who consulted 
with both outside counsel and the chair of Upjohn’s board of directors. Id. at 386. Up-
john’s general counsel also served as Upjohn’s vice president and secretary. Id. 
123 Id. at 387. 
124 Id. The general counsel for Upjohn, along with outside counsel, “interviewed the 
recipients of the questionnaire and some 33 other Upjohn officers or employees as part of 
the investigation.” Id. 
125 Id. 
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Company’s general counsel regarding the alleged payments, and the 
agency also sought the questionnaires and written notes of counsel 
from the interviews conducted.126 
 Upjohn declined to produce the requested items, citing attorney-
client privilege and work-product protections.127 Court proceedings 
followed, instigated by the IRS’s petition seeking enforcement of the 
summons for production of these materials.128 The case eventually 
reached the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where the 
court ruled that a “control group test” should be employed to deter-
mine the scope of the attorney-client privilege.129 Limiting the privilege 
to a “control group” promoted “consultation with counsel” among 
those individuals in the company who were the decisionmakers.130 
 The Supreme Court viewed the privilege more broadly, concluding 
that both the corporation’s privilege and work-product protection ex-
tended to the lawyers’ communications with employees.131 The Court 
was quick to preface its opinion with a statement that it was not provid-
ing “a broad rule or series of rules to govern all conceivable future 
questions in this area,” but it did reject the lower court’s use of a “con-
trol group” test.132 
 The Court’s ruling was premised on the importance of the attor-
ney-client privilege in “encourag[ing] full and frank communication 
between attorneys and their clients.”133 It noted that the “control 
                                                                                                                      
 
126 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 387–88. The IRS summons, issued pursuant to federal law, in-
cluded the following request, which served as the crux of the issue in the case: “The re-
cords should include but not be limited to written questionnaires sent to managers of the 
Upjohn Company’s foreign affiliates, and memorandums or notes of the interviews con-
ducted in the United States and abroad with officers and employees of the Upjohn Com-
pany and its subsidiaries.” Id. 
127 Id. at 388. 
128 Id. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan followed a magis-
trate’s recommendation that the summons be enforced. Id. 
129 Id. at 390, 392; United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226–27 (6th Cir. 1979), 
rev’d, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The Sixth Circuit rejected a “subject matter” test. Upjohn, 600 
F.2d at 1226–27. 
130 Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1227. 
131 See Upjohn, 499 U.S. at 386. 
132 Id. at 386, 397. Chief Justice Warren Burger, concurring in part and in the judg-
ment, preferred that the Court articulate a definitive standard. Id. at 402 (Burger, C.J., 
concurring). He rejected the “control group” test used by the lower court but promoted a 
test that would cover a communication when “an employee or former employee speaks at 
the direction of the management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct 
within the scope of employment.” Id. at 402–03. Chief Justice Burger articulated specific 
attorney functions to which he thought the privilege should apply. Id. at 403. 
133 Id. at 389. In establishing the rule’s purpose, the Court also discussed Federal Rule 
of Evidence 501, which provides that “the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by 
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group” test “frustrates the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging 
the communication of relevant information by employees of the client 
to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation.”134 
The Court reasoned that “the privilege exists to protect not only the 
giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giv-
ing of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and in-
formed advice.”135 In Upjohn, the employees were acting “at the direc-
tion of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from 
counsel” for the corporation.136 
                                                                                                                      
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United 
States in light of reason and experience.” Id. (citing 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in 
Trials at Common Law § 2290, at 542 ( John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961) (discuss-
ing the early history of privilege’s common law development)). The Court noted that the 
privilege applied to corporations and that the government had not contested this general 
proposition. Id. at 390. 
134 Id. at 392. Unwilling to accept the “narrow” interpretation of the lower court, the 
Supreme Court held that the “communications must be protected against compelled dis-
closure.” Id. at 392, 395. The Court, however, did not embrace an unqualified privilege, 
holding that the “privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect 
disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney.” Id. at 
395. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited a passage from City of Philadelphia v. West-
inghouse Electric Corp.,  which states in part: 
A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely 
different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, 
“What did you say or write to the attorney?” but may not refuse to disclose any 
relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a state-
ment of such fact into his communication to his attorney. 
205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962); see Upjohn, 499 U.S. at 395–96. The Court noted that 
the attorney-client privilege only resolved the “responses to the questionnaires and any notes 
reflecting responses to interview questions.” Upjohn, 499 U.S. at 397. But this did not cover 
everything requested in the summons; thus there was a need to consider whether the work-
product doctrine covered additional materials. Id. The Court relied on its holdings in Hick-
man v. Taylor and United States v. Nobles in discussing the policy rationales behind the work-
product doctrine. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236–40 (1975) (emphasizing the 
“strong public policy” of the work-product doctrine); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 497–
98, 509–12 (1947) (creating and justifying the “work product” doctrine). The Court also 
looked at Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, remanding this aspect of the case 
to the lower court noting that “such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing 
of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.” Upjohn, 
449 U.S. at 400–02. The Court stated that the Magistrate had applied the “‘substantial need’ 
and ‘without undue hardship’” standard, and that “a far stronger showing of necessity and 
unavailability by other means than was made by the Government or applied by the Magistrate 
in this case would be necessary to compel disclosure.” Id. at 401–02. 
135 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390. 
136 Id. at 394. 
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 Privileges are narrowly construed because they denigrate the pub-
lic interest in disclosure of relevant information in legal proceedings.137 
They are extended only to contexts in which they are presumed neces-
sary to facilitate communications with counsel.138 The Upjohn Court’s 
presumption was that, absent protection of the privilege, corporate law-
yers would not receive candid disclosures from corporate employees, 
which are necessary for the lawyers to advise and assist their corporate 
clients.139 But why not? Companies can require their employees to 
speak and can threaten to fire them if they do not. Presumably, the Up-
john Court believed that what would motivate employees to speak freely 
was not coercion but their identification with the company’s interests 
and, conversely, absent a promise of legal protection, that they would 
withhold information out of concern for their own or the company’s 
shared interests. 
 Whether identifying with the corporation’s ends or perceiving that 
it would not be in the corporation’s best interest to receive the infor-
mation without the guarantee of confidentiality afforded by the privi-
lege, employees believe that their company will not disclose their 
communications to third parties unless it is in the shared interest of the 
company and the individual to do so.140 Unlike third parties, whose 
communications with corporate counsel conducting the internal inves-
tigation are not privileged, employees’ communications would be cov-
ered, as this provides an incentive to be forthcoming, which is some-
thing that is beneficial to both the individual and the company. 
 Underlying the theory and doctrine in Upjohn is a practical assump-
tion that the company is aligned with the individual employees against 
the government.141 Otherwise, the privilege would mean nothing to 
                                                                                                                      
 
137 See Giesel, supra note 32, at 127 (noting that privilege acts to obstruct truth-finding). 
138 See id. at 127 & n.73 (“[C]ourts have strictly confined [the privilege] within the nar-
rowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
139 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389, 395 (extending privilege protection to employee-
counsel communications “to encourage full and frank communication”). 
140 See Heyman, supra note 29, at 197 (“[E]mployees often have a false sense of security 
that their communications will be kept confidential under the protections of the attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine.”). 
141 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389, 392, 395. Many cases have examined the attorney-client 
privilege and work-product doctrine in the corporate context. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury 
Subpoenas Dated March 19, 2002 & August 2, 2002, 318 F.3d 379, 383–87 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(discussing preexisting third-party documents held by corporate counsel); In re Allen, 106 
F.3d 582, 605–06 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that a former employee’s communications with 
entity counsel were covered under attorney-client privilege); In re Six Grand Jury Wit-
nesses, 979 F.2d 939, 943–44 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the scope of the attorney-client and 
work-product privileges). Many cases also arise in the context of who has the authority to 
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corporate employees and the corporation’s privilege would not have to 
protect employees’ communications with corporate counsel.142 The 
corporation fights to keep the government from obtaining information 
that it gathered for the corporation’s internal use. There is no direct or 
indirect participation by the government in corporate counsel’s efforts. 
B. Corporate-Individual Discord 
 At the opposite end of the spectrum is the corporate internal in-
vestigation that situates the government as an indirect participant in, or 
intended beneficiary of, the corporate internal investigation, rendering 
the corporation’s interests adverse to those of its individual employees. 
Although the internal investigation starts out confidential, its work 
product is meant to be disclosed to the government, which will use the 
information against the corporate employees and treat the corporation 
leniently in exchange. In other words, like a government investigation, 
the object of the internal investigation is evidence gathering, not the 
facilitation of legal assistance. A central fact of this paradigm is that 
however the corporation might pretend to talk to its employees, the 
corporation is in fact the employees’ foe. 
 In this approach, an alliance with its employees is not essential to 
the corporation’s ability to obtain their cooperation. Corporations can 
fire individuals who fail to cooperate with an internal investigation.143 
Likewise, companies can offer perquisites to those who do provide in-
formation.144 The scope of the investigation and what is said to those 
being investigated places corporations in a superior position to indi-
viduals who have no constitutional rights in this corporate investigatory 
process, allowing the entity to exploit employees for its own benefit. 
 In large part, the federal government’s power to indict the corpora-
tion places the company in an adverse position to its employees and ex-
ecutives. The corporate entity has no choice but to be aligned with the 
government if it desires a beneficial resolution of any alleged criminal 
                                                                                                                      
waive the privilege and voluntary disclosures. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 
F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a corporate officer can impliedly waive attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine when testifying before a grand jury even when 
the corporation has explicitly refused to waive); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 
F.3d 681, 684–86 (1st Cir. 1997) (discussing the effects of voluntary disclosures). 
142 The emphasis for counsel was on how best to protect attorney-client privilege and 
work-product doctrine. See Sellinger, supra note 119, at 606–09 (listing the different ways 
counsel can assure that privilege is maintained). 
143 See Campbell & Beaudette, supra note 9, at 5. 
144 See Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 Hastings L.J. 
1, 9–11 (2012). 
100 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:73 
activity. Even when no criminal activity is involved, entering into a coop-
eration agreement avoids the risks of going to trial, possibly encourag-
ing a flood of shareholder lawsuits, and bankruptcy. Because most in-
ternal investigations are not within the court’s view, there is nobody to 
offer relief to an executive or employee placed in the disadvantageous 
position of being asked to provide information to the investigating 
counsel—information that may later be used against the individual. 
 The problem, though, is that employees may be unaware of coun-
sel’s desire to secure information that will benefit the company at the 
employees’ expense.145 This sometimes becomes an issue in litigation 
over the admissibility of the individual’s statements to corporate coun-
sel after the corporation has waived the privilege and provided the evi-
dence to the government.146 In this context, individuals sometimes 
claim that they were implicitly represented together with the corpora-
tion and that they can therefore personally assert the privilege.147 It 
may then become significant whether counsel complied with the ethics 
rules and recommended practices.148 Typically, the corporation’s law-
yers caution employees that they represent the company only and that 
the company has the exclusive authority to assert or waive its privilege 
with respect to the employees’ statements to counsel.149 Sometimes, 
however, counsel does not make his or her role clear.150 The individual 
employee may have previously dealt with corporate counsel and may 
assume that counsel continues to serve as his or her attorney. The cor-
poration’s lawyer may deliberately exploit this misunderstanding be-
cause emphasizing that counsel represents the entity may discourage 
the individual from cooperating. 
                                                                                                                      
145 See Giesel, supra note 32, at 164–65 (suggesting that in case after case, counsel fails 
to correct employees’ misunderstandings because the omission permits corporate counsel 
to gain more useful information); see Heyman, supra note 29, at 203. 
146 See Jonathan N. Rosen, In-House Counsel and the Government’s War on Corporate Fraud, 
Crim. Just., Fall 2010, at 5, 6 (discussing a district court that granted an employee’s mo-
tion to dismiss on the grounds that corporate counsel was also the employee’s personal 
counsel). 
147 See Giesel, supra note 32, at 113 n.8 (noting a case in which an employee claimed 
that corporate counsel represented the employee personally). 
148 See Rosen, supra note 146, at 6 (describing the affirmation of a district court’s find-
ing of corporate counsel’s professional misconduct because the employee thought counsel 
represented him personally); infra notes 199–204 and accompanying text (describing at-
torney ethics rules). 
149 See Griffin, supra note 14, at 337. 
150 See Cummings, supra note 5, at 681 (describing how corporate counsel give “wa-
tered-down” warnings that leave employees with the mistaken belief that counsel repre-
sents them in addition to the corporation). 
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 Unfortunately for the individual employee seeking the benefit of a 
personal attorney-client privilege, the applicable case law tends to favor 
the corporation and the government. Jurisdictions often follow the Be-
vill test, established by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
the 1986 case, In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp.151 
The Bevill test places on the individual asserting a privilege with the cor-
poration’s counsel the onus to prove the following five factors: 
First, they must show they approached [counsel] for the pur-
pose of seeking legal advice. Second, they must demonstrate 
that when they approached [counsel] they made it clear that 
they were seeking legal advice in their individual rather than 
in their representative capacities. Third, they must demon-
strate that the [counsel] saw fit to communicate with them in 
their individual capacities, knowing that a possible conflict 
could arise. Fourth, they must prove that their conversations 
with [counsel] were confidential. And, fifth, they must show 
that the substance of their conversations with [counsel] did 
not concern matters within the company or the general affairs 
of the company.152 
 The premise of the Bevill test is that corporations are ordinarily 
adverse to their employees, that employees understand that adversity, 
and that, therefore, employees will not regard the corporation’s lawyer 
as their own except in the most limited circumstances. This test places a 
near-insurmountable burden on the individual employee seeking to 
show that he or she is entitled to assert attorney-client privilege.153 
                                                                                                                      
 
151 805 F.2d 120, 123–25 (3d Cir. 1986). 
152 In re Bevill, 805 F.2d at 123–25 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Grand Jury In-
vestigation, 575 F. Supp. 777, 780 (N.D. Ga. 1983)) (approving implicitly how the district 
court placed the burden on the employee to establish five factors to assert personal attor-
ney-client privilege over communications with corporate counsel); see also United States v. 
Norris, 722 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639–40 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (noting that “the burden of demon-
strating that a privileged relationship exists nonetheless rests on the party who seeks to 
assert it” (citing United States v. Costanzo, 625 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1980))). 
153 Some circuits may still examine the individual’s perception of whether an attorney-
client privilege existed. See Cummings, supra note 5, at 676–77 (discussing circuits that 
favor the individual). A rare occasion might allow for individual consideration under Bevill. 
For example, one court stated that 
if the communication between a corporate officer and corporate counsel spe-
cifically focuses upon the individual officer’s personal rights and liabilities, 
then the fifth prong of In Matter of Bevill can be satisfied even though the 
general subject matter of the conversation pertains to matters within the gen-
eral affairs of the company. 
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 Once the internal investigation concludes, the company may turn 
over its work product and the government may proceed against indi-
viduals, at which point there may be opportunities for judicial oversight 
and regulation. The government may be restrained in its ability to use 
the company essentially as its investigative or prosecutive agent.154 
 United States v. Norris, an unpublished 2011 Third Circuit decision 
affirming an employee’s conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice,155 
illustrates the risk of unfairness at the unregulated internal investiga-
tion stage. Ian P. Norris, a foreign national, served as the Chief Execu-
tive Officer (CEO) of the Morgan Crucible Company (“Morgan”), a 
United Kingdom corporation.156 Norris was indicted in the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania following an antitrust 
                                                                                                                      
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the indi-
vidual could not meet the test of showing that the matter related to the individual’s per-
sonal rights). 
154 For example, in the 2008 case United States v. Stein, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that accounting firm KPMG’s policy of conditioning and capping its 
employees’ legal fees infringed on those employees’ right to counsel because of the govern-
ment’s influence in setting KPMG’s policy. 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d. Cir. 2008). The court re-
jected the government’s argument that KPMG’s past fee practices for those facing indictment 
was voluntary, finding that the district court had determined “that absent any state action, 
KPMG would have paid defendants’ legal fees and expenses without regard to cost.” Id. at 
156. In Stein, the court examined government actions that resulted in KPMG not paying the 
attorney’s fees of thirteen former partners, employees, and one executive of the company 
who faced indictment. Id. at 135. The court found that “KPMG’s adoption and enforcement 
of a policy under which it conditioned, capped and ultimately ceased advancing legal fees to 
defendants followed as a direct consequence of the government’s overwhelming influence.” 
Id. at 136. The court used the Memorandum of Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson 
(the “Thompson Memorandum”) as part of its basis for finding government interference 
with the defendants’ right to counsel. Id. at 136, 142–44. The post-investigative restraint in 
Stein contrasts with the essentially unregulated nature of corporate internal investigations. In 
Stein, a court was able to intercede and provide relief to the corporate constituents because 
the case had passed the internal corporate investigation stage. See id. at 139 (describing how 
the employees were indicted after the company signed a deferred prosecution agreement 
and implying that most employee-defendants had not made proffer statements or pled 
guilty). Absent court oversight, one has to wonder if the defendants would have received paid 
counsel. It can be argued that the right to counsel does not accrue until criminal charges 
have been filed, and therefore there is no right during an investigatory stage. See Susan R. 
Martyn, Accidental Clients, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 916–17 (2005) (noting that the right to 
counsel attaches when a person is accused of a crime). Professor Lisa Kern Griffin has dis-
cussed a possible extension of Garrity immunity for employees interviewed by internal inves-
tigators pursuant to pending deferred prosecution agreements. Griffin, supra note 14, at 
353–58; see Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 494, 500 (1967). This contrast with internal 
corporate investigations suggests the need for better oversight during internal investigations. 
155 419 F. App’x 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). 
156 Id. at 191–92; United States v. Norris, 719 F. Supp. 2d 557, 560 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (not-
ing that Norris is a citizen of the United Kingdom), aff’d, 419 F. App’x 190 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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investigation.157 He was subsequently extradited to the United States, 
tried, and convicted for conspiracy to obstruct justice.158 The govern-
ment, in a press release following sentencing, said “that Norris orches-
trated an elaborate conspiracy with his subordinates to obstruct the 
grand jury’s investigation by creating a false script that employees of 
both Morgan and its competitor were to follow when questioned dur-
ing the investigation.”159 Norris’s appeal did not provide him relief; he 
was left to pay the fine and serve the eighteen-month prison sen-
tence.160 
 For purposes of this discussion, it is important to focus on an un-
successful pre-trial, trial, and appellate argument raised by Norris con-
cerning the court’s permitting counsel who conducted the internal in-
vestigation to testify against Norris at his trial.161 This argument sheds 
light on the workings of the internal corporate investigation and the 
clash between corporate individuals and the company. 
 Upon receipt of a subpoena from the government, the company 
(Morgan) retained counsel to handle its response to the subpoena and 
to conduct an internal investigation.162 One partner in this outside 
firm, considered the “relationship partner,” assigned the matter to an-
                                                                                                                      
157 See Norris, 419 F. App’x at 191. The four-count indictment charged Norris with con-
spiring to fix prices in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1, conspiracy to obstruct justice in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the specific offenses of obstruction underlying this conspiracy 
charge, including 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) and § 1512(b)(2)(B). Id. at 192. Norris could 
not be prosecuted for the conspiracy to fix prices because of an extradition issue. Id. at 192 
n.1. 
158 Id. at 192. Norris was convicted of violating the conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, 
by conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) and § 1512(b)(2)(B). Interestingly, he was 
acquitted of the actual substantive counts that served as the underlying conduct of the 
conspiracy. Id. He was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment and was fined $25,000. 
Id. 
159 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former CEO of the Morgan Crucible Co. Sen-
tenced to Serve 18 Months in Prison for Role in Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice (Dec. 10, 
2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/December/10-at-1426.html. 
160 Norris, 419 F. App’x at 191–92. The Third Circuit rejected Norris’s arguments that 
the evidence was insufficient to show that he “corruptly persuaded others with intent to 
influence their grand jury testimony,” that the jury had been improperly instructed on an 
element of one specific offense of obstruction, and that the trial court had erred by “fail-
ing to identify for the jury the overt acts alleged in the indictment.” Id. at 193–95. The 
court also rejected Norris’s argument that it was improper for counsel to testify at trial. Id. 
at 195. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 3, 2011. United States v. 
Norris, 132 S. Ct. 250 (2011) (denying certiorari). 
161 See Norris, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 639–40 (finding that corporate counsel did not repre-
sent Norris individually); see also Norris, 419 F. App’x at 195 (affirming the district court’s 
denial of privilege). 
162 Norris, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 634. 
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other partner to handle the response for the grand jury.163 For over a 
two-year period, this latter attorney served as the main internal corpo-
rate investigator and as the company’s connection to the DOJ Antitrust 
Division.164 As internal investigator, this attorney requested that Mor-
gan executives provide documents for his review.165 He also interviewed 
key executives in the United Kingdom.166 During his investigation, the 
attorney found that subordinates of the defendant, Norris, had created 
“non-contemporaneous meeting summaries (‘scripts’)” of the meetings 
between representatives of Morgan and representatives of its competi-
tors, and that these “scripts” were being used by employees in answer-
ing the attorney’s questions.167 The attorney eventually turned these 
“scripts” over to the Antitrust Division.168 
 As one might surmise, the “scripts” became a component of the 
government’s case against Norris for conspiracy to obstruct justice.169 
The trial court was then faced with the question of whether the  investi-
gating attorney could testify against Norris.170 The backdrop of this is-
sue concerned whether the internal investigating attorney represented 
Norris, the employee, in addition to Morgan, the company.171 Norris 
presented strong evidence confirming his belief that counsel served 
concurrently as his personal attorney.172 This evidence included the 
fact that the attorney was at Norris’s side when he was interviewed by 
Canadian antitrust authorities173 and that the attorney’s law firm “pro-
vided Norris with a letter identifying the Law Firm as Norris’ counsel in 
                                                                                                                      
163 Id. at 635. 
164 Id. at 634–35. 
165 Id. Specifically, the attorney requested that Morgan’s executives “[p]rovide any 
documents (located in the U.S. and abroad) describing or referring to any meeting or 
other communication between (i) any of the relevant individuals and (ii) representatives 
of any competitor in the relevant business area.” Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Norris, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 636. The attorney negotiated “an agreement with the An-
titrust Division that by providing certain documents, including the scripts (the ‘selected 
documents’), Morgan would not waive its right not to produce other foreign-based docu-
ments.” Id. at 635. There is conflicting evidence on whether the attorney had permission 
from Morgan’s executives to submit these documents to the government. Id. at 636. 
169 Norris, 419 F. App’x at 193. 
170 Id. at 192. 
171 See Norris, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 634. 
172 Id. at 636–37. 
173 Id. at 636. The attorney was also at Norris’s side during a regulatory proceeding be-
fore the Federal Trade Commission. Id. at 637. 
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case he encountered difficulties with immigration officials.”174 Addi-
tionally, the relationship partner—that is, the original attorney assign-
ing the case to the investigating attorney—testified that he “understood 
the Law Firm also represented Norris personally.”175 Contrary evidence 
was presented by the internal investigating attorney, who “told Norris 
that he represented the company (Morgan) and did not represent 
Norris personally.”176 
                                                                                                                     
 Interestingly, the government recognized this ambiguity and ex-
plicitly asked the law firm to specify by name the individuals it repre-
sented,177 to which the firm responded, “this [Law Firm] represents the 
parent company, its affiliates and its current employees.”178 Despite this 
 
174 Id. at 637. This letter was marked “Privileged and Confidential Communication 
From Counsel,” and it instructed Norris to contact his lawyer if he ran into problems with 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service when flying into the United States. Joint Ap-
pendix at 407–08, Norris, 419 F. App’x 190 (No. 10-4658) (letter of Oct. 29, 1999, to Ian 
Norris from Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts). The letter stated, “Give us a call, and 
we’ll handle it from there.” Id. at 407. It also stated “your lawyers are” and then provided 
the names of the individual lawyers within the firm. Id. at 408. The letter included the 
lawyers’ telephone, cellular, home, and in one case pager numbers for Norris were he to 
encounter problems at the border. Id. at 408. Additionally, Norris had letters addressed 
“To Whom It May Concern” for the INS, FBI, and DOJ. Id. at 409–10 (letter of Nov. 1, 
1999, to “whom it may concern” from Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts); id. at 411 
(letter of Nov. 1, 1999, to “whom it may concern” from Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & 
Roberts). These letters explicitly stated that Norris wished to remain silent and that federal 
agents were “prohibited by law from interrogating him at this time.” Id. at 409–11. One 
letter also stated, “[w]e also hereby advise and represent to you that our client has author-
ized us to accept service on his behalf of any grand jury subpoena addressed to him.” Id. at 
409–10. 
175 Norris, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 635, 637. 
176 Id. The internal investigating attorney also testified at a preliminary hearing that 
“[a]t no time did Norris ask [the corporate attorney] to represent him personally.” Id. 
177 Joint Appendix, supra note 174, at 3416–17 (letter of July 30, 2001, from Lucy P. 
Mcclain, DOJ, to Sutton Keany, Pillsbury Winthrop LLP). 
178 Norris, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 636. An internal email supported the firm’s answer to the 
government attorney. Id. It stated that the firm represented Morgan’s current employees, 
“including but not limited to, Mike and Bruce.” Id. A follow-up letter to the government 
stated in part: 
[T]his [Law Firm] represents Morganite Industries, Inc. and its parent com-
pany, The Morgan Crucible Company plc, in connection with matters related 
to the investigation which you are conducting on behalf of the Division. We 
presumptively also represent all current employees of the companies in con-
nection with the matter. Only Messrs. Cox and Muller were at one time iden-
tified as individuals that you would like to have appear before the grand jury; 
when that occurred, we acted on their behalf. We continue to do so. Should 
you wish to call other current employees, I assume that we would also repre-
sent those individuals. 
Id. 
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evidence, the trial court found that Norris had not asked the attorney 
to represent him personally and had never discussed personal legal 
matters with him.179 Therefore, the court held that the attorney could 
testify against Norris at his trial.180 
 The trial court used the well-accepted Bevill test181 and placed the 
onus on Norris to prove its five factors.182 Finding that Norris’s proof 
was deficient, the court ruled that Norris could not claim an attorney-
client privilege.183 The Third Circuit upheld this decision finding that 
the district court was the fact finder and that it “did not legally err in 
applying this test.”184 
 Whether or not Norris reasonably believed that the company’s law-
yers also represented him personally, he certainly reasonably believed 
that his interests were aligned with those of the company. Indeed, the 
two-year time span of this corporate internal investigation, the fact that 
the internal investigators were not immediately supplying documents to 
the government and were preserving the corporate privilege, and the 
fact that the lawyer accompanied Norris to regulatory hearings and pro-
vided him with legal documentation asserting a representative capacity, 
all indicate that the company and Norris were not initially taking oppo-
site positions.185 One has to wonder whether Norris would have sup-
plied the company investigators with the script if he thought his inter-
ests were not aligned with the company. The evidence provided to the 
government by Morgan proved detrimental to Norris.  Morgan, how-
ever, may have been able to use the evidence as leverage to obtain for 
the company a favorable plea agreement with the government.186 
                                                                                                                      
179 Id. at 637. 
180 Id. at 639–40. 
181 See supra notes 151–153 and accompanying text. 
182 Norris, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 638. 
183 Id. at 639–40. 
184 Norris, 419 F. App’x at 193–95. 
185 See Norris, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 635–37. 
186 Morgan Crucible Company pled guilty in 2002 to tampering with witnesses and de-
stroying documents and paid a fine of one million dollars. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Former CEO of the Morgan Crucible Co. Found Guilty of Conspiracy to Obstruct 
Justice ( July 27, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2010/260826.htm. 
Morganite Inc., a subsidiary of Morgan, pled guilty to fixing prices, paying a ten million dol-
lar fine. Id. The plea agreement outlines the company’s agreement for cooperation, although 
it explicitly excludes Norris and three others from being required to cooperate with the gov-
ernment as part of this agreement. See Plea Agreement at 12–17, United States v. Morganite, 
Inc., No. 02-733 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2002). 
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C. How Law and Ethics Favor Corporate Superiority 
1. Legal Theory Favoring the Entity 
 Although the Norris case has its idiosyncrasies, the legal theory pre-
sented in this case with respect to attorney-client privilege in the corpo-
rate sphere is not unique.187 In several recent cases in which a corpo-
rate internal investigation has provided the government a clear basis 
for a prosecution of executives and employees, those individual execu-
tives and employees have argued that the attorney conducting the in-
vestigation was serving as the individual’s own counsel.188 Courts, how-
ever, adhere to the principle that “corporate officers and directors may 
not claim a privilege for communications made to counsel in their cor-
porate capacities,”189 favoring the position that counsel represents the 
corporation and not the specific individuals who provided evidence to 
this counsel as part of an internal investigation. Individuals do not ap-
pear to make the alternative argument that, although the lawyers may 
have represented the company exclusively, there was an implied under-
standing that the company would not disclose the individual’s state-
ments to the government without the individual’s agreement, or that 
the employment relationship otherwise required the company to con-
sider the individual’s interests in deciding whether to waive privilege. 
 Courts routinely reference the Bevill decision in holding that the 
entity has the power to control the release of the privilege between the 
entity and the corporate constituent.190 Individual employees, thus, are 
faced with the impossible task of proving that counsel represented 
                                                                                                                      
187 See Lucian E. Dervan, Overcriminalization 2.0: The Symbiotic Relationship Between Plea 
Bargaining and Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 645, 647–48 (2011) (discussing the 
“creative use of the obstruction of justice laws” in another case, the Computer Associates 
prosecution, United States v. Kumar). 
188 See, e.g., United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that a 
corporate investigating attorney represented the company, and had no individual attorney-
client relationship with the company’s employees); In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under 
Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 335 (4th Cir. 2005) (denying motions to quash grand jury subpoenas 
for items claimed by AOL Time Warner employees to be attorney-client-privileged materi-
als from an internal investigation). See generally Paul B. Murphy & Lucian E. Dervan, Attor-
ney-Client Privilege and Employee Interviews in Internal Investigations, White-Collar Crime 
Rep., Aug. 2006 (discussing the attorney-client privilege in internal investigations); Rosen, 
supra note 146 (discussing the consequences of a company’s decision to cooperate with the 
government). 
189 Norris, 722 F. Supp. 2d. at 637 (citing In re Bevill, 805 F.2d at 124–25 and Maleski v. 
Corporate Life Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 1, 4–5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)). 
190 See, e.g., Graf, 610 F.3d at 1159; United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 608 n.7 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
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them individually. For example, the statements of three former em-
ployees of AOL Time Warner who had been interviewed by general 
and retained counsel were found not to be privileged.191 This was de-
spite the fact that the individuals believed “that the information [they] 
disclosed to the investigating attorneys was privileged under the com-
mon interest doctrine.”192 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit placed the burden on the corporate constituent to prove that 
the statements were privileged.193 
 The possible consequences of denying attorney-client privilege to 
individual employees are not limited to the government’s use of the 
individuals’ statements against them. Individuals who provide false 
statements to the company’s counsel may be prosecuted for obstruction 
of justice when corporate counsel in turn conveys those statements to 
the government. For example, in the highly publicized Computer As-
sociates investigation, the government prosecuted the former CEO and 
chair of the board under an obstruction of justice statute for acts that 
included allegedly lying to private outside counsel who was conducting 
an internal investigation.194 This issue was never reviewed by the appel-
late court because the case was resolved via plea agreement.195 
                                                                                                                      
 
191 In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d at 335–36. 
192 Id. at 337. The “common interest doctrine” refers to the “joint defense privilege,” a 
way to protect communications between parties that have entered into a joint legal strategy 
under the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 337, 341. 
193 Id. at 338–39. The Fourth Circuit stated: 
[W]e conclude that appellants could not have reasonably believed that the 
investigating attorneys represented them personally during the time frame 
covered by the subpoena. First, there is no evidence that the investigating at-
torneys told the appellants that they represented them, nor is there evidence 
that the appellants asked the investigating attorneys to represent them. To 
the contrary, there is evidence that the investigating attorneys relayed to 
Wakeford the company’s offer to retain personal counsel for him at the com-
pany’s expense, and that they told John Doe 1 that he was free to retain per-
sonal counsel. Second, there is no evidence that the appellants ever sought 
personal legal advice from the investigating attorneys, nor is there any evi-
dence that the investigating attorneys rendered personal legal advice. Third, 
when the appellants spoke with the investigating attorneys, they were fully 
apprised that the information they were giving could be disclosed at the 
company’s discretion. Under these circumstances, appellants could not have 
reasonably believed that the investigating attorneys represented them per-
sonally. 
Id. at 339–40. 
194 See United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 617, 618 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Specifically, the 
government alleged that Kumar, past CEO and chairman, in an effort to cover up the exis-
tence of the 35-day month practice, lied to [Computer Associates’ (“CA’s”)] outside coun-
sel, instructed CA’s general counsel to coach CA employees to lie, authorized CA’s general 
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 The government’s legal theory may be fair when the employee 
understands that the company is acting as the government’s agent for 
investigative purposes and intends to provide the employee’s state-
ments to the government. But the company is unlikely to make this in-
tention plain because doing so places the attorney-client privilege at 
risk as the ambiguous communication might not be considered confi-
dential.196 Additionally, the employee may be less likely to cooperate 
with counsel if there is an indication that the statements may eventually 
be evidence used against him or her. 
 Further, the employee may expect not only confidentiality but also 
loyal and competent advice. For example, an employee of the Stanford 
Group Company sued for malpractice the law firm and partner she 
thought were representing her individually before the SEC.197 Her 
complaint claimed that the attorney was representing the interests of 
Allen Stanford, the Stanford Companies, and other alleged defendants 
and that this conflicting representation resulted in her interests not 
being protected and her being criminally charged.198 Thus, the conse-
                                                                                                                      
 
counsel to pay a $3.7 million bribe to an individual to procure his silence, and lied to FBI 
agents and others during his interview at the [U.S. Attorney’s Office].”). 
195 Id. at 619–20. 
196 It is a necessary element of the privilege that statements be made in confidence to 
counsel for the purpose of legal assistance. Giesel, supra note 32, at 123 n.55 (quoting 
Wigmore, supra note 133, § 2292). If the lawyer’s intended role is to serve as a mere con-
duit—for example, to convey the information to a third party—then there is no expecta-
tion of confidentiality, and hence no privilege, from the outset. See id. 
197 Plaintiff’s Original Petition, supra note 6, at 2–3. The employee claimed that the 
evening prior to meeting with her, the law firm partner “had solicited a multi-million dol-
lar retainer from Allen Stanford [former Stanford Group chairman] to represent him 
personally.” Id. at 5. 
198 See Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 4, Pendergest-Holt v. Sjoblom, No. 3:09-
cv-00578 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2009). This case was eventually dismissed without prejudice. 
Lisa A. Cahill, Cases Highlight Minefield in Internal Investigations, N.Y. L.J., May 21, 2009, at 4, 
9. The complaint stated: 
[D]uring the sworn oral testimony, [the attorney] gave contradictory answers 
about whether, as an attorney, he represented Plaintiff by stating: ‘I represent 
the company Stanford Financial Group and affiliated companies,’ while con-
tradicting that very statement, by also informing Plaintiff and the SEC, on the 
record, as follows: 
Q. Just so we’re clear. As I understand your statement, you do not 
as far as you’re concerned, represent the witness here today? 
A. I represent her insofar as she is an Officer or director of one of 
the Stanford affiliated companies. 
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, supra, at 6; see also Plaintiff’s Original Petition, supra 
note 6, at 6; Cahill, supra, at 9; Ashby Jones, Did Pendergest-Holt Lawyer Up Too Late?, Wall 
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quences of a legal theory favoring the entity can be severe for the indi-
vidual caught up in an internal investigation. 
2. Ethical Considerations 
 Although ethics rules require clarity when lawyers are dealing with 
an unrepresented party, the corporate standards appear to favor the 
entity’s interest in access to and control over its employees’ informa-
tion. Rule 4.3 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct requires lawyers generally to make “reasonable efforts 
to correct the misunderstanding” if an unrepresented person misun-
derstands the role of the attorney.199 Specifically, the attorney must clar-
ify his or her role when dealing with corporate constituents.200 But at 
the same time, the rule presumes that corporate counsel represents the 
company exclusively. Rule 1.13, which governs corporate representa-
tion, begins with the statement that “[a] lawyer employed or retained 
by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly 
authorized constituents.”201 This sentence is matched in the Restatement 
of Law Governing Lawyers, which states that “[w]hen a lawyer is employed 
or retained to represent an organization: (a) the lawyer represents the 
interests of the organization as defined by its responsible agents acting 
                                                                                                                      
St. J. L. Blog (Mar. 4, 2009, 8:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/ 
2009/03/04/did-pendergest-holt-lawyer-up-too-late/. 
199 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.3 (2009). The rule states: 
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by coun-
sel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person mis-
understands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable 
efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice 
to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person 
are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of 
the client. 
Id. 
200 Id. R. 1.13(f). Subsection (f) of Rule 1.13 states: 
In dealing with an organization’s directors, officers, employees, members, 
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the 
client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organiza-
tion’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer 
is dealing. 
Id. A different provision of the Model Rules, which applies to lawyers who represent multi-
ple constituents in a corporation, permits concurrent representation only when the inter-
ests of the constituent and the corporation do not conflict. See id. Rs. 1.13(g); 1.7. 
201 Id. R. 1.13(a). 
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pursuant to the organization’s decision-making procedures.”202 Both 
ethics rules emphasize corporate counsel’s relationship to the entity 
over counsel’s relationships with the entity’s constituents. 
 Additionally, the rules do not require corporate counsel to clarify 
the company’s relationship to the constituent, to disclose the com-
pany’s intention to assist the government, or otherwise to provide in-
formation needed to dispel misconceptions and allow the employee to 
make an informed decision whether to speak to counsel. Although 
other ethics rules can also come into play here,203 those rules do not 
specifically instruct corporate counsel to notify corporate constituents 
that the information they provide as part of an internal investigation 
can and likely will be used against them and will not be protected by an 
attorney-client privilege.204 Nor do they require corporate counsel to 
let employee constituents know that the entity may barter their infor-
mation for its own corporate benefit. There is also no ethics require-
ment, in the corporate context, that the investigating attorney offer 
legal counsel to the constituent or suggest that the constituent should 
have counsel. 
                                                                                                                     
III. Court Considerations in Leveling the Playing Field 
 Scholars have explored the contours of the Bevill test and noted its 
deficiencies, focusing on the question of when an individual establishes 
an attorney-client relationship with corporate counsel.205 Professor 
Grace M. Giesel, for example, has called for enhanced clarity between 
lawyers and individual employees within the corporation, including 
 
202 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 96(1) (2000) (first sub-
section). The second subsection of this rule provides that this is qualified when the lawyer: 
knows of circumstances indicating that a constituent of the organization has 
engaged in action or intends to act in a way that violates a legal obligation to 
the organization that will likely cause substantial injury to it, or that reasona-
bly can be foreseen to be imputable to the organization and likely to result in 
substantial injury to it, the lawyer must proceed in what the lawyer reasonably 
believes to be the best interests of the organization. 
Id. § 96(2). 
203 See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(c) (2009) (“It is professional mis-
conduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or mis-
representation.”). 
204 See, e.g., id. Rs. 1.13, 4.3, 8.4. 
205 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 5, at 675–76, 678–81 (analyzing the theoretical basis 
for the attorney-client privilege); Giesel, supra note 32, at 151–58 (discussing the cases that 
have used Bevill in finding that the investigating attorney represented the corporation as 
opposed to the individual). 
112 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:73 
having a written record that memorializes the disclosures regarding 
representation of the investigating attorney.206 Others have addressed 
the general unfairness of the government’s ability to extract privilege 
waivers from corporations,207 critiquing the various DOJ memoranda 
pertaining to benefits available to a company for providing attorney-
client privileged information.208 
 Our focus, in contrast, is on how the Upjohn decision and other 
attorney-client privilege cases fail to recognize today’s reality where the 
entity may have multiple concerns in an internal investigation. Main-
taining the confidentiality of the internal investigation may or may not 
be the route eventually taken by the corporation. A corporation may 
also change its position, starting initially with the protections provided 
by Upjohn, but later wishing to waive those restrictions to secure a reso-
lution favorable to the company. 
 It is important to recognize the legitimacy of internal investigations, 
which may expose criminal conduct, but it is also important to eliminate 
deceptive and coercive conduct on the part of corporations. This is par-
ticularly difficult, as the unfair conduct may come to light only in an af-
ter-the-fact court hearing that is held when an employee is charged with 
                                                                                                                      
206 Giesel, supra note 32, at 164–68. Along similar lines, Professor Susan B. Heyman has 
suggested that a “bottoms-up” approach, focusing on the individual and including incen-
tives for both corporations and individuals to cooperate in investigations, would be benefi-
cial. Heyman, supra note 29, at 167–69. 
207 See Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement’s Multi-front Assault on 
the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 Vill. L. Rev. 469, 484, 515 (2003); 
Christopher T. Hines, Returning to First Principles of Privilege Law: Focusing on the Facts in 
Internal Corporate Investigations, 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 33, 84 (2011); Gregory C. Sisk & Pamela 
J. Abbate, The Dynamic Attorney-Client Privilege, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 201, 202–04 (2010). 
But see Julie R. O’Sullivan, Does DOJ’s Privilege Waiver Policy Threaten the Rationales Underlying 
the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine? A Preliminary “No,” 45 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 1237, 1238–39 (2008) (responding to claims of the demise of the attorney-client privi-
lege and noting the power imbalance between corporations and the government). A 
strong coalition has developed to protect the attorney-client privilege in the corporate 
setting. See Ide, supra note 5, at 1–2 (describing the coalition’s work to influence U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission and DOJ policy); Memorandum, Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-
Client Privilege, Comprehensive Reform Still Critically Needed to Protect Attorney-Client 
Privilege and Employee Legal Rights ( Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/ 
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=17443 (listing organizational members of the Coalition to Pre-
serve the Attorney-Client Privilege). 
208 See Copeland, supra note 81, at 1210–37 (discussing the Attorney-Client Privilege 
Protection Act of 2009 and the history of different DOJ memoranda). Although the 
Thompson Memorandum has been modified to remove the incentive for a corporation to 
give attorney-client-privileged material to the government, Professor Heyman has noted 
that the “top-down” practice still entails coercion and waiver in practice. Id. at 169. 
2013] Achieving Fairness for Constituents in Corporate Internal Investigations 113 
criminal conduct and then seeks to assert the privilege regarding state-
ments made during an internal investigation. 
 Offered here is a model for resolving an individual constituent’s 
claim that his or her statements to corporate counsel are covered by the 
attorney-client privilege. It is meant to incentivize corporations to act 
fairly throughout the process, even when the investigation is unregu-
lated and private. After-the-fact court monitoring, in the context of de-
ciding privilege claims, would provide “expressive rhetoric” to compa-
nies to proactively adhere to conduct that is noncoercive and non-
deceptive.209 
 This Part describes three aspects of this model, all of which arise in 
the context of the attorney-client privilege. First, a conceptual model of 
fair dealing needs to be at the forefront of corporate conduct when 
there is an interaction between the corporation and the individual as 
part of an internal investigation.210 Second, courts evaluating the cor-
porate-individual relationship need to go beyond the constricted ap-
proach offered by courts using the Bevill test or similar methods that 
favor the entity without full examination of the circumstances of a par-
ticular case.211 Suggested here are a constellation of different consid-
erations that could be used by courts in deciding who will be allowed to 
maintain an attorney-client privilege. Finally, the burden of proof 
should be placed on the entity to show that it has treated its employee 
constituents fairly.212 All three aspects of the proposed model empha-
size the need to distinguish the initial holding in Upjohn to reflect the 
reality of a modern-day internal investigation. 
A. Conceptualizing Corporate Fair Dealing 
 Courts are quick to adopt a Bevill approach without examining how 
the corporation’s internal investigation differs from the classic approach 
embodied in the Upjohn case. To evaluate this landscape properly, two 
questions need to be examined. First, how should the corporation and 
its lawyer conduct themselves at the outset to make it clear whether the 
                                                                                                                      
209 Cf. Gilchrist, supra note 144, at 57 (“Maintaining the expressive value of criminal 
prosecutions . . . . means structuring a system of liability, prosecutorial discretion, and 
criminal penalties that express clear condemnation when it is appropriate to do so.”); Dan 
M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 2075, 2081–86 
(2006) (arguing that laws that are “perceived as affirming the values of only some cultural 
perspectives and as denigrating others” are vulnerable to being overturned). 
210 See infra notes 213–221 and accompanying text. 
211 See infra notes 222–242 and accompanying text. 
212 See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
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corporation is aligned with its individual constituents? Second, if the 
entity fails to clarify its role, how should courts evaluate the corporate 
dynamic for purposes of attorney-client privilege and representation by 
counsel? The essence of this discussion is the role of fair dealing by the 
entity to its corporate constituent. 
 A corporation should have a duty of fair dealing with its employees. 
General employment law provides that “[e]mployers must realize that if 
they are going to reap the profits and rewards of employee loyalty and 
enhanced workmanship which are coaxed by implied promises made to 
the workforce, then such employers must be held to their word.”213 This 
provides an implied “covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” which 
includes not creating or exploiting a misperception.214 Although em-
ployment contracts may provide for duties of good faith and fair deal-
ing, only a minority of states have allowed terminated employees to suc-
ceed with claims that the employer owes the employee a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing absent such a contractual provision.215 
 This employment theory is not explicitly replicated in corporate 
law with respect to the corporation’s duties to its constituents. Although 
directors and officers of a corporation have duties of fair dealing to the 
corporation and through them to the stockholders,216 these fiduciary 
duties are not manifested in corporate law for the corporation’s deal-
ings with its employees. Likewise, individual employees of an entity 
have duties of fair dealing to the entity, but the reverse is less certain 
without turning to basic employment principles.217 
 Corporate counsel conducting an investigation may have, or ap-
pear to have, a common interest with corporate executives and em-
ployees. But counsel also is often caught between his or her allegiance 
to, and representation of, the entity and the practical need to counsel 
and acquire information from corporate executives and employees. 
                                                                                                                      
213 Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1388, 1392–93 (D. Colo. 1987) (discussing 
the corporation’s obligations to its employees). 
214 Id. 
215 James J. Brudney, Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
in American Employment Law, 32 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 773, 773–74 (2011); see, e.g., For-
tune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255–56 (Mass. 1977) (holding that even 
though a terminated salesperson’s contract was at-will, the employer owed the individual 
an implied covenant of good faith). 
216 See Brown, supra note 16, at 8 n.11 (describing officers’ duty of fair dealing to the 
corporation and shareholders). 
217 See Brudney, supra note 215, at 794 (noting that employees’ duty of loyalty is de-
rived from a master-servant agency framework rather than a theory of mutual responsibil-
ity). 
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Corporate investigating counsel is thus caught in what one court 
termed “a potential legal and ethical mine field.”218 
 Equally troubling is the predicament of the corporate executive or 
employee who has been working closely with in-house counsel over a 
period of years. A trust relationship may have developed between the 
parties, as it may be a common practice for corporate counsel to obtain 
information from the constituent on various corporate matters. In an 
Upjohn world, the counsel and the individual work together for the 
benefit of the company. In today’s reality, however, the employee or 
corporate executive can now find him- or herself suddenly pitted 
against the corporation and its counsel whom he or she once thought 
of as the person encouraging the sharing of information in a trusting 
relationship. Yet, the individual constituent may be unaware, because of 
his or her longstanding relationship with counsel, that their interests 
now differ. 
 Counsel may attempt to alleviate any concern by providing warn-
ings to the employee. These warnings, referred to as Upjohn warn-
ings,219 fail to negate the fact that the corporation will still try to secure 
information from its employees that may ultimately be harmful to 
them.220 These Upjohn warnings should not be accepted as alleviating 
the direct conflict that the corporation has with its constituents.221 In 
                                                                                                                      
 
218 In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 2005). 
219 Despite being called “Upjohn warnings,” Upjohn did not deal with warnings to em-
ployees at all. Giesel, supra note 32, at 110 n.2. See generally Upjohn v. United States, 449 
U.S. 383, 386 (1981). According to practitioners’ literature, the warnings referred to as 
Upjohn warnings should include: a warning that the attorney represents the company and 
not the employee; a warning that the attorney does not represent the employee’s interests; 
a warning that although the conversation is protected by attorney-client privilege, privilege 
belongs to the company, not the employee; and a warning that the company will decide 
whether to waive the privilege, including whether to give the information to third parties. 
See, e.g., Campbell & Beaudette, supra note 9, at 7. 
220 As is common to police agencies, providing Miranda warnings can result in not re-
ceiving desired information. See Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 516–17 (1966) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting). Hearing that one is entitled to counsel or that statements can be used 
against oneself may cause a suspect to choose silence or retention of a lawyer. See id. Obvi-
ously, a major difference in this corporate setting is that the investigating corporate coun-
sel has not been schooled by and is not a direct part of a police agency. Another major dif-
ference is that unlike a police investigative agency that is meeting the defendant for the 
first or second time, there may be a longstanding relationship premised upon the attorney-
client privilege between the corporate investigating counsel and the employee. It may be 
only now, during the internal investigation, that criminal misconduct is alleged, and it is 
not in the individual’s benefit to have this alliance with the corporation. 
221 The conflicting position of internal investigating counsel is recognized in legal 
scholarship, matching the growing body of practitioner literature instructing investigating 
counsel to give Upjohn warnings when speaking with individual employees. See Cindy A. 
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many cases, the individual employee will perceive that the corporation’s 
lawyer represented him or her in the past. Even if the lawyer advises 
that he or she is now representing only the company, the individual will 
expect some loyalty. One would not be allowed to move from defend-
ing a criminal client to then prosecuting the defendant. The conflict 
remains and cannot be avoided by language offered by a coercive party, 
an employer who may eventually barter the information for its own 
benefit. Even if the employee does not expect loyalty from the corpora-
tion’s lawyer, the employee will expect loyalty from the corporation. 
The Upjohn warnings do not advise the employee that the corporation’s 
interests are potentially adverse and that in exchange for leniency, the 
corporation may assist the prosecution by conveying the employee’s 
communications, thereby facilitating a prosecution of the employee. 
 Recognizing a duty of fair dealing by a corporation to its individual 
constituents would allow courts to evaluate conflicts between the entity 
and individual without summarily finding that the entity’s view controls. 
The good faith of the employer in its internal investigation would be 
paramount in ascertaining the rights and remedies of the individual 
constituent. As a matter of fair dealing, corporations and their attor-
neys conducting an internal investigation should have to be candid 
about whether the corporation intends to cooperate with the govern-
ment and the resulting risks to the employees. When the corporation 
leads its employees to understand that their interests are aligned with 
those of the entity, the corporation assumes an implied duty not to 
waive the privilege with regard to the employees’ communications 
without their consent, or at least fairly to consider the employees’ in-
terests in deciding whether to waive the privilege. 
 This suggested approach is not without concerns. Obviously, the 
use of a conceptual standard comes at the risk of diminishing reliability 
and consistency. The existing Bevill standard, which places the decision 
making on attorney-client privilege basically within the power of the 
corporation, offers certainty that cannot be replicated with either a 
conceptual or multifaceted approach. 
                                                                                                                      
Schipani, The Future of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 34 Del. 
J. Corp. L. 921, 949, 954–60 (2009) (discussing the modern-day attorney-client privilege in 
light of deferred prosecution agreements and cooperation); John E. Sexton, A Post-
Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443, 465 & 
n.93 (1982) (noting the attorney’s potential conflict of interest stemming from disparate 
corporate and employee interests). 
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B. A Multifaceted Approach 
 If the entity fails to clarify properly its role at the initial stages of 
the corporate internal investigation and fails to designate whether it is 
aligned or not with its employee, this failure should weigh heavily in 
determining whether the corporation can unilaterally waive the privi-
lege and provide its employee’s statements to the government. In these 
situations, courts may need to evaluate the corporate dynamic for pur-
poses of attorney-client privilege claims. To this end, it is important that 
courts scrutinize the entity-constituent relationship rather than summa-
rily finding corporate superiority to the detriment of the individual. 
 To accomplish this, courts need to examine a host of factors when 
considering the investigating corporate counsel’s role in conjunction 
with the rights of the individual employee. This Section offers several 
considerations for a court to use in determining whether the corpora-
tion and its constituents are aligned or in conflict. Although this multi-
faceted approach may offer some reliability and consistency to this pro-
cess, it is important to note that there is no formula or quantitative 
analysis that provides definitive clarity to the issue. Rather, a fact-
specific approach is warranted, and these factors are merely attributes 
for courts to consider in balancing corporate and individual interests. 
1. Guilt of the Corporate Constituent 
 Some may argue that the disintegration of the corporate-employee 
relationship is warranted in situations in which the individual has de-
liberately committed criminal conduct that imposes liability on the 
corporation. One cannot, however, assume that all corporate constitu-
ents act solely for individual benefit and thus should be the subject of a 
criminal prosecution. Obviously, within organizations there can be 
rogue employees who act criminally for personal motives. But there 
also can be employees who receive no personal benefit and may be 
committing criminal acts solely to benefit the corporation.222 Employ-
ees may have responded to demands from the corporation that were 
impossible to satisfy through lawful means.223 The superior negotiating 
                                                                                                                      
 
222 See, e.g., Podgor, Educating Compliance, supra note 50, at 1525 n.14 (noting the case 
of Jamie Olis, who received no monetary benefit from his alleged criminal conduct of a 
fraudulent tax scheme on behalf of his company, Dynegy, for which he was Senior Director 
of Tax Planning). 
223 See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing 
the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 933, 964–66 (2005) (dis-
cussing corporate culture and how employees may have to “navigate through the political, 
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position of the corporation, however, allows it to negotiate a benefit to 
the detriment of the less culpable party—the individual who has no 
motive other than to enhance the entity’s position in the market. 
 Thus, omitted from the existing judicial review process is the cul-
pability of the individual. Individuals who act merely to benefit the cor-
poration and receive no personal incentives should not be placed in an 
inferior position on issues such as attorney-client privilege. Instead, 
courts might require, in appropriate circumstances, that corporations 
also protect individuals who act improperly because of their strong al-
legiance to the company. 
2. Culpability of the Corporate Entity 
 Equally likely is a corporate culture that breeds criminal conduct. 
Although prosecutorial discretion provides prosecutors with the ability 
to prosecute, reach a plea agreement, defer prosecution, or reach a 
non-prosecution agreement, the assessment of the evidence used in 
making the determination may be skewed when provided by a corpo-
rate entity that has resources beyond an individual employee.224 Corpo-
rate counsel’s allegiance to the corporation will make him or her advo-
cate for prosecutors to use their prosecutorial discretion to minimize 
corporate liability. In contrast, the unrepresented or poorly repre-
sented employee may not be able to make as strong a case as the entity. 
 Therefore, considering the culpability of the corporation is just as 
important as looking at the culpability of an individual employee. The 
corporation that has a criminal “ethos”225 and wishes to throw its con-
stituents to the prosecution to protect the entity should receive less pro-
tection than a corporation with a strong compliance program that was 
not adhered to by a small number of rogue employees. 
3. Corporate Willful Blindness 
 Likewise, a corporation that opts for willful blindness and fails to 
investigate wrongdoing among its constituents should not be allowed to 
                                                                                                                      
economic, socio-cultural, physical, and technological demands of regulators” in perform-
ing their job functions). 
224 See, e.g., Schipani, supra note 221, at 961 (“[P]rosecutors have considerable discre-
tion in determining when, whom, how, and even whether to prosecute for violations of 
federal criminal law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
225 Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1095, 1099–1101 (1991) (discussing how one should examine the “corporate ethos” in 
determining the standard of criminal liability). 
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then turn on these same individuals when it initially took a laissez-faire 
approach to governing internal conduct. Knowledge of corporate or 
individual misconduct may be found when an individual or corporation 
is willfully blind. The Model Penal Code describes “knowledge of the 
existence of a particular fact” to include a situation in which “a person 
is aware of a high probability of [the fact’s] existence, unless he actually 
believes that it does not exist.”226 Most recently, in the 2011 patent in-
fringement case, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled that willful blindness requires that “(1) the defen-
dant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact 
exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid 
learning of that fact.”227 
 An entity that puts its head in the sand228 and avoids knowing the 
truth of criminal conduct occurring within the company should bear 
greater liability than an individual who honestly thinks his or her con-
duct is legal and acceptable under corporate norms. Courts, therefore, 
might consider whether the entity was willfully blind in ascertaining 
whether the constituent had a trust in the entity and corporate counsel 
that created an attorney-client relationship. 
4. High Managerial Agent or Low-Level Employee 
 Courts should also consider the placement of the individual in the 
corporate structure. A high-level managerial agent is more likely to in-
teract with corporate counsel.229 In contrast, a lower-level employee 
may not even know the identity of corporate counsel, not to mention 
that the company even has corporate counsel. 
 Whereas corporate criminality is typically premised upon respon-
deat superior, the Model Penal Code takes a minority approach and also 
considers whether the alleged criminal act related to a member of the 
board of directors or a “high managerial agent acting in behalf of the 
corporation within the scope of his office or employment.”230 Although 
                                                                                                                      
 
226 Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) (1985). 
227 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068, 2070 (2011). 
228 See United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228–29 (7th Cir. 1990) (indicating 
that willful blindness is known as the “ostrich” defense). But see United States v. Black, 530 
F.3d 596, 604 (7th Cir. 2008) (clarifying that ostriches really do not bury their heads in the 
sand when frightened). 
229 See Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate 
Context, 28 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 473, 494 (1987) (“[L]awyers are involved intimately with 
company management and operations.”). 
230 See Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c) (1985). The Model Penal Code also states that 
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high managerial agents should likely assume a greater culpability for 
knowledge of corporate acts, they also are more apt to secure legal 
guidance. Thus, the placement of the individual within the company 
may be indicative of his or her interaction with corporate or investigat-
ing counsel, such as whether there has been a reliance on counsel and 
the entity in accord with the perception of the individual constituent.231 
5. Prior Involvement with Corporate Counsel 
 An examination of the employee’s prior involvement with corpo-
rate counsel may also provide information that allows a court to ascer-
tain whether the employee properly relied on the corporate counsel as 
being his or her own when the corporate constituent was cooperating 
with the internal investigation. Some of the questions a court might 
consider here are: Did counsel routinely appear with the individual at 
regulatory hearings? Did counsel often meet with the individual to 
work on legal matters such as answering interrogatories in civil matters? 
Who was at the employee’s side when he or she appeared in a court 
hearing? Did the constituent often turn to counsel seeking answers to 
corporate policy questions? 
 When individuals routinely turn to counsel for legal advice, it can 
set a tone that said counsel is representing the individual in addition to 
the corporate entity. Looking at the relationship between the constitu-
ent and corporate counsel can offer clues as to whether an attorney-
client relationship actually existed. More importantly, it can also pro-
vide evidence of whether the individual constituent rightfully relied on 
the existence of an attorney-client bond. 
6. Size and Structure of the Entity 
 Corporations with many employees are treated differently for pur-
poses of sentencing than entities with fewer employees. For example, 
larger organizations are expected to “devote more formal operations 
                                                                                                                      
“high managerial agent” means an officer of a corporation or an unincorpo-
rated association, or, in the case of a partnership, a partner, or any other 
agent of a corporation or association having duties of such responsibility that 
his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation 
or association. 
Id. § 2.07(4)(c). 
231 A neutral investigation is usually conducted by attorneys that are not within the of-
fice of corporate counsel. Outside counsel is typically hired to assure a thorough and con-
flict-free investigation. 
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and greater resources in meeting the requirements” or applicable 
guidelines than are smaller organizations.232 As a result, larger compa-
nies can receive a greater “culpability score” in the federal sentencing 
guidelines. So, too, organizations that tolerate criminal activity are as-
sessed at different levels depending on the number of employees, with 
an entity with a higher number of employees receiving a greater culpa-
bility score than the entity with fewer individuals.233 Using this same 
analysis, it would seem appropriate to consider the size of the organiza-
tion in determining whether the corporation should bear the brunt of 
the criminality and whether counsel should be more focused on com-
pliance in the larger corporate setting. 
 Equally important is whether the corporation is a public company 
subject to SEC regulation or a small, closely held corporation, such as a 
family-run entity. In a closely held corporation, it may be more difficult 
to ascertain who exactly counsel is representing. This suggests that per-
haps courts should use a different standard with respect to the attorney-
client privilege for closely held companies.234 
7. Expansiveness of the Company 
 Corporations that have many domestic or foreign offices may raise 
additional considerations. Do employees routinely need to advise coun-
sel of activities in these foreign countries? Does counsel routinely over-
see the activities of corporate employees? A longstanding relationship 
can create reliance between the parties that is sufficiently unique to 
warrant a court moving beyond the strict language found in the Bevill 
standard. 
 Likewise, for constituents of international companies operating 
outside the United States, with little understanding of U.S. law, it may be 
common to defer to corporate counsel. One has to wonder, for exam-
ple, about the level of knowledge of Ian P. Norris, the Morgan Crucible 
Company’s indicted CEO, discussed earlier in this Article. After all, he 
was not a citizen of the United States and was operating in a company 
                                                                                                                      
232 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1 cmt. n.2(C) (2011). 
233 See id. § 8C2.5. Differences in the culpability score are based on factors of whether 
there are more than ten, fifty, two hundred, one thousand, or five thousand employees. Id. 
“[T]olerance of the offense by substantial authority personnel” (meaning, individuals who 
have significant discretion over the entity’s actions) that is “pervasive throughout the or-
ganization” can also influence the culpability score. Id. 
234 Paul J. Sigwarth, Note, It’s My Privilege and I’ll Assert It If I Want To: The Attorney-Client 
Privilege in Closely-Held Corporations, 23 J. Corp. L. 345, 356–64 (1998) (discussing the 
uniqueness of a closely held corporation for purposes of the attorney-client privilege). 
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that was located outside this country.235 In this regard, one can ask 
whether it would make an individual more likely to rely on the corpo-
rate counsel where operating as part of an international organization? 
 On the other hand, a large company with many different offices 
may be very removed from corporate counsel. Such an attenuated 
connection to counsel would be less likely to lead an individual to rely 
on a belief that he or she was being represented by the counsel and 
corporation. 
8. Crime Involved 
 One cannot assume that all crimes should be treated the same 
when determining whether corporate counsel was aligned with its cor-
porate constituent. Some crimes may be more personally focused 
whereas others may be more corporate. For example, liability under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act arises only with the involvement of a pub-
lic company.236 Antitrust crimes can also stem from corporate set-
tings.237 In contrast, a perjury charge is personal to an individual.238 
Other crimes may cross into both the corporate and personal 
spheres.239 For example, companies as well as individuals have been 
charged with the crime of obstruction of justice.240 
                                                                                                                     
 Looking at the specific crime may offer some guidance. If the 
crime is specific to the person, one has to wonder why corporate coun-
sel might be accompanying that person to the grand jury. Alternatively, 
a corporate charge under the Sherman Act may indicate that counsel is 
there to represent the company. 
 Here again, this factor alone does not offer conclusive guidance in 
determining if the corporation’s actions are consistent with the inter-
ests of its constituents. But using this factor in examining the totality of 
the circumstances may provide insight as to the role of the investigating 
counsel relative to the entity’s constituents. 
 
235 See supra notes 155–160 and accompanying text. 
236 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to dd2, 78ff (2006). 
237 See id. § 1 (making restraint of trade illegal). 
238 See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006). 
239 For example, the Racketeered Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) 
offers a host of state and federal offenses that can serve as predicate acts for a RICO 
charge. See id. §§ 1961–1963. 
240 See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 702–03 (2005) (com-
pany charged with obstruction of justice); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 279 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (individual, Martha Stewart, charged with obstruction of an agency proceed-
ing). 
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9. Entity’s Efforts to Dispel the Perception That Counsel Represents 
the Individual 
 In civil matters, the perception of the client can play a crucial fac-
tor in determining the existence of an attorney-client relationship. 
Some courts use contract law, others tort law, and finally some examine 
both disciplines.241 Reasonable reliance can be a key component in de-
termining whether an attorney-client relationship was formed through 
negligence on the part of the attorney.242 
 What is noticeable in the corporate context is that courts are reluc-
tant to consider these factors, adhering instead to a corporate bias that 
labels counsel as representing the corporation. In this regard, corpo-
rate efforts to dispel the individual’s perception that counsel is repre-
senting them personally should be factored into the court’s analysis of 
the dynamic between counsel and its constituent. 
 When counsel gives clear Upjohn warnings—which include a strict 
statement that counsel’s role is limited to protecting the corporation’s 
interests—and obtains a written acknowledgment that counsel does not 
represent the individual, the Upjohn warnings would weigh in favor of 
the entity’s claim that it did not represent the individual constituent. 
The entity would have strong evidence that its constituent’s perception 
of an attorney-client relationship was unfounded when the constituent 
was given documentation explicitly showing that he or she had been 
fully apprised that counsel solely represented the entity. 
 That said, a written statement should not be conclusive of a find-
ing that counsel did not represent a corporate constituent. One could 
easily envision an employee being coerced to sign such documentation 
out of fear of being fired. Upjohn warnings should not be a proxy for 
alleviating corporate liability, but rather should be one factor that a 
court might consider. Looking at the totality of the circumstances is 
important to truly ascertain the voluntariness of such a document and 
the circumstances surrounding its endorsement. 
 Moreover, even the conventional Upjohn warnings do not dispel an 
individual employee’s expectation of loyalty from a corporation’s lawyer 
with whom he or she has had past dealings. Nor do the warnings dispel 
the individual’s belief that there is a unity of interest between the indi-
vidual and the corporation and that the corporation will treat the indi-
vidual fairly in its dealing with the government. A court should thus 
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242 See id. at 919. 
124 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:73 
consider the employee’s reasonable expectations that the corporation 
and lawyer will look out for the individual’s interests in assessing 
whether the corporation has met its obligations of fair dealing. 
10. Other Factors 
 Although many considerations are noted here, it is important to 
recognize that no list can exhaust all the possible considerations that 
might reflect whether the corporation has acted in good faith with its 
constituents. Courts need to think about all the factors outlined here, 
but must also be open to other factors that might be offered by the par-
ties. 
 There is a cost to a multifaceted approach in that it limits consis-
tency and reliability. Different courts may find that specific circum-
stances warrant different resolutions. As with all legal decision making, 
the addition of more factors may result in less predictability. But this 
downside is surpassed by the fact that these factors will allow courts to 
evaluate all circumstances and provide a more balanced approach than 
the existing methodology. 
C. Burden of Proof 
 An additional point that can level the playing field so that courts 
are not summarily siding with corporations without consideration of 
the circumstances would be to adopt a burden of proof that places the 
onus on the corporation to show why the attorney-client privilege 
should be either respected or rejected. The existing Bevill approach 
places the burden on individuals to prove that counsel was representing 
them personally if they wish to achieve an attorney-client privilege.243 
This framework empowers the party that least needs the assistance. It 
fails to consider that the entity may have the resources and power to 
assure that the employee’s argument does not survive. So, leveling the 
playing field does not merely call for an examination of the constella-
tion of factors, but also for a recognition that the burden of proof and 
presumptions should not flow automatically to the entity rather than 
the individual. 
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Conclusion 
 Criminal procedure jurisprudence has developed for well over a 
century to establish limits on government investigators’ ability to ex-
tract confessions from individuals for use against them in criminal 
prosecutions.244 The law targets both deceptive and coercive methods 
of extracting admissions.245 The nineteenth-century evidence law, now 
largely supplanted, identified conduct that led to out-of-court admis-
sions that were deemed insufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial. 
Twentieth-century constitutional case law, which developed initially out 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution and later out of the right against self-incrimination and the right 
to counsel, expanded beyond concerns about reliability to protect a 
host of other interests.246 
 In recent years, analogous concerns have been raised about corpo-
rate lawyers’ methods of obtaining admissions from corporate employ-
ees for later use in criminal prosecutions. The government’s role as an 
indirect participant in internal corporate investigations increases the 
corporation’s superiority in the process and motivates this growing 
concern. The unregulated nature of corporate internal investigations 
exacerbates the disparity between the positions of the corporation and 
the individual. The practice of distancing corporate counsel from its 
constituents by giving Upjohn warnings during internal investigations 
fails to eliminate the individual’s reasonable expectation that his or her 
interests are aligned with the corporation. This failure is particularly 
problematic when the corporation later uses information it gained 
from its employee to achieve leniency for the corporation at the indi-
vidual’s expense. 
 In Upjohn, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a corporation could 
claim the attorney-client privilege with respect to its lawyers’ confiden-
tial communications with corporate constituents in the context of an 
internal investigation. The Court was not asked to consider, and did not 
address, whether the constituent also could claim the privilege or bar 
the corporation from waiving the privilege, and the Court has failed to 
address this question since. Lower courts have assumed, however, that 
except in exceptional circumstances, the privilege is exclusively for the 
                                                                                                                      
244 See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458–66 (describing the history of the privilege against 
self-incrimination). 
245 See id. at 448 (“[C]oercion can be mental as well as physical.”). 
246 See generally Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 
Am. J. Crim. L. 309 (1998) (detailing the “long and convoluted history” of the admissibility 
of confessions). 
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corporation to assert or waive, without regard to the interests of the 
constituent who made the communications in question. Upjohn ad-
dressed a corporation aligned with its constituents. But this does not 
reflect the contemporary reality of all internal investigations. 
 Although Upjohn implicitly recognized an alignment of interests 
between the corporation and its employees, it did not address whether, 
as a consequence, corporate employees may assert the privilege with 
regard to their communications with counsel in an internal investiga-
tion. To the extent that Upjohn implied that corporations have exclusive 
authority to assert the privilege or to barter the individual’s statements 
to the government, it should be reconsidered. The standard for deter-
mining when a corporation may waive the privilege and disclose what 
its constituent communicated to corporate counsel should take into 
account whether, in eliciting the individual’s statements and then seek-
ing to disclose them, the corporation would be violating its duty of fair 
dealing to the individual. If disclosure would violate fair dealing in light 
of the various factors set forth in this Article, the company should not 
be permitted to disclose the constituent’s statements without the con-
stituent’s authorization. 
 Courts presently use an efficient approach that can deprive corpo-
rate constituents of fairness and good faith by the company. Courts 
need to expand upon the current attorney-client privilege jurispru-
dence to take account of a corporation’s duty to treat its employees fair-
ly and not to exploit them. 
